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1CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Modern computer systems are plagued by security vulnerabilities and flaws on many levels.
Those vulnerabilities and flaws are discovered and exploited by attackers for their various
intrusion purposes, such as eavesdropping, data modification, identity spoofing, password-based
attack, and denial of service attack, etc. The security of our computer systems and data is
always at risk because of the open society of the internet. Due to the rapid growth of the
internet applications, intrusion detection and prevention have become increasingly important
research topics, in order to protect networking systems, such as the Web servers, database
servers, cloud servers and so on, from threats.
According to the definition in [10], a computer attack is the intelligence of evading or evading
attempt of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.
Intrusion Detection can be seen just as a classification problem in which a given network traffic
event is assigned as normal or malicious. The focus of this thesis is to build Intrusion Detection
System, which is a mechanism designed to monitor and analyze network traffic information and
users’ activities in the target system in a given environment, and decide whether the activities
are symptomatic of an attack or a legitimate use of the system. The process of intrusion detec-
tion includes the following phases: data collection, data pre-processing, intrusion recognition,
and reporting and response. In order to fight against extraordinarily intelligent cyber-attacks
in the era of rapidly growing information technology, effective and efficient intrusion detection
systems are needed to promptly detect and prevent intrusion. Therefore, automatic intrusion
detection is more demanding than ever. Various artificial intelligence and machine learning
techniques, e.g., rule-based induction, classification, data clustering and data mining, have
been widely used to obtain underlying models from training data. In this thesis, we aim to
2build more accurate and efficient intrusion detection systems for classifying audited data into
being intrusive or normal, using probabilistic graphical models.
According to different methodologies for training and predicting, there are mainly three
categories [43] of intrusion detection systems: signature-based intrusion detection, anomaly-
based intrusion detection, and hybrid intrusion detection. Signature-based intrusion detection
identifies intrusions by matching audited data with pre-defined description of intrusion. This
method is efficient in detecting well-known types of intrusions but usually fails to detect zero-
day type intrusions. Anomaly-based intrusion detection methods establish models from normal
behaviors and identify audited data by measuring the deviation between observed data and the
built models. It is good at detecting new intrusions, but usually has high false positive rate.
The hybrid intrusion detection is a combination of the former two approaches. The intrusion
detection systems built in this thesis are hybrid intrusion detection systems that are obtained
based on both normal and abnormal data records.
As summarized by Liao et al. [42], there are three main challenges in current intrusion
detection researches:
1. Lower the false negative rate is one focus for signature-based intrusion detections, espe-
cially for some zero-day attacks. And lower the false positive rate is a focus for anomaly-
based intrusion detection.
2. Collect training data set to build intrusion detection system. An intrusion may cause
changes in some network traffic features. Those features could be collected from data
packets in networks, command sequences from user input, low-level system information,
e.g., system call sequences, log files, and CPU/memory usage, etc. A problem of great
interest [8] in the training of intrusion detection systems is how to select key and effective
features from a huge set of possible related features.
3. Enable intrusion detection systems to respond promptly and be real time.
In this thesis, we attempt to build more efficient Intrusion Detection System through three
different approaches, from different perspectives and based on different situations. We cover
those three approaches in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, respectively.
3In Chapter 2, we propose Bayesian Model Averaging of Bayesian Network (BNMA) Clas-
sifiers for intrusion detection. In this work, we compare our BNMA classifier with Bayesian
Network classifier and Naive Bayes classifier [26, 63], which were shown be good models for
detecting intrusion with reasonable accuracy and efficiency in the literature. The main idea
of BNMA [58] is that we choose k best Bayesian network models instead of using just one,
and average those k selected models. When we have large amount of training data, many
approaches are capable of producing models that fit the data well, and thus predicting future
data accurately. However, large-size training dataset may be time consuming to collect in
practice, we then very often have to rely on small-size dataset. In this case, there may exist
more than one Bayesian networks that perform equally well in fitting the distribution of the
training dataset, and the performance of using any single Bayesian Network classifier may not
be satisfactory. The issue just mentioned was originally a very important motivation for us
to think about using the BNMA on intruders and normal users classification. The BNMA
first selects the k best Bayesian network models based on models’ posterior probability out
of all possible models given the training data. Then it predicts audited data by averaging all
the k chosen models with weights proportional to their posterior probabilities. We conduct
experiments over the KDD CUP 99 dataset [31], one of the most popular public datasets for
evaluating intrusion detection systems. Our experiment results show that the BNMA classifier
performs better than the Bayesian Network Classifier and Naive Bayesian Classifier in both
accuracy and AUC (Area Under ROC). From the experiment results, we see that BNMA can
be more efficient and reliable than its competitors, i.e., the Bayesian network classifier and
Naive Bayesian Network classifier, for all different sizes of training dataset. The advantage
of BNMA is more pronounced when the training dataset size is small. In fact, BNMA with
smaller-size training dataset can work equally well, or even better than other models with
larger-size training dataset. Therefore, the BNMA has the ability to accelerate the detection
process as it could potentially save the time needed to collect more training data records.
In Chapter 3, we introduce the Situational Data Model as a method for collecting dataset
to train intrusion detection models. Unlike previously discussed static features as in the KDD
CUP 99 data [31], which were collected without time stamps, Situational Data are collected
4in chronological sequence. Therefore, they can capture not only the dependency relationships
among different features, but also relationships of values collected over time for the same fea-
tures. The Situational Data Model is designed following the Situ framework [11], which was
originally proposed for human-intention-driven service evolution in context-aware service envi-
ronments. The Situ framework has a few advantages. For instance, Situ allows us to model and
detect human intention by inferring human desires [64], and capture the corresponding context
values through observation. Specifically, we collect our Situational Dataset following the struc-
ture of situation, consisting of desire, action and environmental context: The desire component
describes a user’s segmental thinking about the system at a specific time. This component
makes the Situational data model to be more informative than other sequential data. On the
other hand, the action component of the Situaiontal Dataset indicates a user’s behaviors and
operations on the system, and the environmental context indicates the system’s status during
the time when the actions are performed. In Situational Data Model, each data record is a se-
quence of situations collected at different time points. With Situational Dataset, we are able to
train the relationships between actions, context and desires that happen at different time points,
and build intrusion detection systems to classify the intention of a new sequence of situations,
into being either intrusive or normal. In our research, we collected our Situational Dataset in
Cooperative Research Envrionment(CoRE), which is a real web application. Through CoRE,
the data set is generated from more than 120 invited participants. To compare the Situational
Dataset and the traditional dataset consisting of only action sequences, we adopt the Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) to build intrusion detection systems based on both datasets and then
compare the two IDS. The experiment results show that the intrusion detection model trained
by Situational Dataset outperforms that trained by action-only sequences.
In Chapter 4, we introduce the Situation Aware with Conditional Random Fields Intrusion
Detection System (SA-CRF-IDS). The SA-CRF-IDS is trained by probabilistic graphical model
Conditional Random Fields (CRF) [32] over the Situational Dataset proposed in Chapter 3.
In SA-CRF-IDS, we hope to further improve the intrusion detection efficiency by both using
a more informative training dataset, i.e., Situational Dataset, and adopting a more efficient
classification model, i.e., CRF. In this chapter, we compare the Conditional Random Fields
5and Hidden Markov Model for intrusion detection by both theoretic arguments and numerical
experiments. For intrusion detection, CRFs can be more flexible and representative than
other similar training methods such as the Hidden Markov Model, as often discussed in the
literature. Our SA-CRF-IDS framework includes two layers: the desire layer and temporal
intention layer. Both of the two layers are trained by CRF. The predicting processes of SA-
CRF-IDS can be described as follows: Firstly, in the desire layer, SA-CRF-IDS labels a sequence
of desires according to the sequence of actions and context. Secondly, in the temporal intention
layer, SA-CRF-IDS labels a sequence of temporal intention value which quantifies the degree
of attacking potential of the desires in numbers. Thirdly, the intention of situation sequences
are classified to be either intrusive or normal based on the corresponding sequence of temporal
intention values. A key idea of SA-CRF-IDS is that it predicts future audited data based on
human’s punctuated desires, instead of relying only on user’s action and environmental context.
In this chapter, our main interest is to compare the Conditional Random Field model and the
Hidden Markov Model on each of the two datasets: the dataset with action-only sequences,
and Situational Dataset proposed in Chapter 3. The results show that the CRF outperforms
HMM with significantly better detection accuracy, and better ROC curve when we run the
experiment on the non-Situational dataset. On the other hand, the two training methods have
very similar performance when the Situational Dataset is adopted.
We conclude our work from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4 with a discussion in Chapter 5, including
the accomplished work and potential future work.
6CHAPTER 2. BAYESIAN MODEL AVERAGING OF BAYESIAN
NETWORK CLASSIFIERS FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
Abstract
In order to defend against extraordinary intelligent attacks in the era of rapidly grow-
ing information and technology nowadays, effective and efficient intrusion detection models
are needed to detect and prevent intrusion promptly. Bayesian network (BN) classifiers with
powerful reasoning capabilities have been increasingly utilized to detect intrusion attacks with
reasonable accuracy and efficiency. However, existing approaches using BN classifiers for in-
trusion detection face two problems. First, the structures of Bayesian network classifiers are
either manually built with the help of domain knowledge or trained from data using heuristic
methods that usually select suboptimal models. Second, the classifiers are trained using very
large datasets which may be time consuming to obtain in practice. When the size of training
dataset is small, the performance of a single Bayesian network classifier is significantly reduced
due to its inability to represent the whole probability distribution. To alleviate these problems,
we build a Bayesian classifier by Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) over the k-best Bayesian
network classifiers, called Bayesian Network Model Averaging (BNMA) classifier. We train and
evaluate the classifier on the NSL-KDD dataset, which is less redundant, thus more judicial
than the commonly used KDD Cup 99 dataset. We show that the BNMA classifier performs
significantly better in terms of detection accuracy and Area Under ROC (AUC) than the Naive
Bayes classifier and the Bayesian network classifier built with heuristic method. We also show
that the BNMA classifier trained using a small dataset even outperforms two other classifiers
trained using a very large dataset, thus BNMA is particularly effective when large training
datasets are unavailable. This also implies that the BNMA is beneficial in accelerating the
7detection process due to its less dependance on the potentially prolonged process of collecting
large training datasets.
Key Words: Intrusion detection system, Bayesian network, Bayesian Model Averaging, De-
tection accuracy.
2.1 Introduction
An intrusion detection system is a mechanism used to monitor system and network situa-
tions, collect useful data such as suspicious activities and environmental context information,
and analyze such data to predict and detect malicious intentions. As the amount of network
throughput increases and security threat intensifies, intrusion detection systems have drawn
much attention in recent years. In general, intrusion detection approaches are classified as
either Signature-based Intrusion Detection (SD) or Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection (AD).
SD is the process to compare signature patterns of known attacks or threats against captured
events for recognizing possible intrusions. AD is the process to find deviation from a known
behavior, and construct profiles representing the normal or expected behaviors derived from
monitoring regular activities, network connections, hosts or users over a period of time [42].
Existing intrusion detection systems (IDS) are divided into five different types according to
a survey paper by They are: Network-based IDS, which monitors network traffic data; Host-
based IDS, which monitors and analyzes host activities like system calls, application logs and
so on; Stack-based IDS, which examines the packets as they go through the TCP/IP stack;
Protocol-Based IDS, which monitors the protocol in use of the computing system; and Graph-
Based IDS, which is concerned with detecting intrusions that involve connections between many
hosts or nodes.
Regardless of the types of systems, the challenge is to build effective predictive models with
low error rates by utilizing and integrating various data resources. To achieve this goal, various
approaches have been proposed. These include statistic-based, pattern-based, rule-based, state-
based and heuristic-based approaches. As a statistic-based approach, Bayesian network (BN)
8has been widely used in intrusion detection field due to its robustness in modeling the joint
distribution of random variables and reasoning under uncertainty.
Sebyala et al. [49], Amor et al. [4], Vijayasarathy et al. [60], and Altwaijry & Algarny [3]
built Naive Bayesian classifier, a type of simplified BN, to identify possible intrusions. Amor
et al. [4] also compared Naive Bayes with the technique of decision tree and showed that Naive
Bayes can reach a result almost as good as decision tree but with much faster computation.
However, there is a very strong assumption in Naive Bayes that the feature nodes in the Naive
Bayes model are independent from each other given the root node, which is not always the case
in practice.
Kruegel et al. [38] proposed an event classification that makes full use of Bayesian networks
and allows the modeling of inter-feature-node dependencies. They showed that these extensions
improve the quality of the decision process and significantly reduce the number of false alarms.
Lu et al. [26] gave a two-stratum Bayesian networks-based anomaly detection and decision
model for IDS. Laskey et al. [41] created an innovative human behavior model to model user
queries and detect situations and insider threats to information systems using multi-entity
Bayesian networks. In [5], An et al. used dynamic Bayesian networks to model temporal
environments and detect any privacy intrusions. In these applications, the network model
structures were manually constructed with the help of domain knowledge without utilizing
the training data that better reflects the real situation. To address this problem, Wee et al.
[63] performed model selection by learning the BN structure from data. However, the model
selection in [63] was conducted using heuristic methods, which usually select suboptimal models.
Further, most of the classifiers were trained and evaluated by utilizing the KDD Cup 99
dataset, which consists of about 0.5 million records [31]. A classifier trained with such a huge
training dataset is usually capable of representing the probability distribution, thus achieves
very good performance. However, obtaining such large-scale datasets can be challenging in
practice, as it may take an unreasonably long time to collect the data resources. When the
training dataset is small relative to the number of features considered, it is usually hard to select
a single classifier model that properly represents the probability distribution of the model space.
In such a situation, using a single model usually leads to poor classification on future data.
9To address the problems raised above, we built a Bayesian classifier for intrusion detection
by Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) over the k-best Bayesian network classifiers. Instead
of selecting a single Bayesian network classifier, we perform model selection to find the top k
Bayesian network classifiers according to a certain scoring metric. When future data points are
classified, the decision is made by averaging over the prediction results of the k-best Bayesian
network classifiers. The motivation of doing this is that multiple Bayesian networks are better
than one Bayesian network in representing the probability distribution of the model space, thus
they offer better predictive power than one network, particularly in the domain where only small
training datasets are available. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to employ
BMA method in intrusion detection research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we briefly introduce the
concept of Bayesian network classifiers and BMA. We then introduce our BNMA classifier,
which makes predictions by averaging over k-best Bayesian network classifiers. In Section 2.3,
we describe the NSL-KDD dataset from which our training and testing datasets are drawn.
In Section 2.4, we outline the construction and evaluation of our Bayesian Network Model
Averaging (BNMA) classifier. In Section 2.5, we illustrate the details about the design of
experiments and experimental results. In Section 2.6, we conclude with some discussions and
ideas for future work.
2.2 Bayesian Networks and Bayesian Model Averaging
2.2.1 Bayesian Network Classifier
A Bayesian network G is a probabilistic graphical model that encodes a joint probability
distribution over a set of variables X = {X1, X2, ..., Xn} based on conditional independencies
[24]. It is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where each node represents a random variable and
an edge denotes a direct probabilistic dependency between the two connected nodes. For each
node, there is a conditional probability distribution (CPD) containing the probabilities of the
node taking different values given its parents’ value. Formally, the DAG structure asserts that
each node is conditionally independent of all non-descendants given its parent nodes. By these
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assertions, the BN compactly represents the joint probability distribution as
p(X1, X2, ..., Xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(Xi|PaG(Xi)), (2.1)
where PaG(Xi) denotes the set of parent nodes of Xi in G, and p(Xi|PaG(Xi)) specifies the
conditional probability distribution (CPD) of Xi given PaG(Xi).
Figure 2.1 gives a simple example of Bayesian network that portrays the probabilistic re-
lationships among binary variables Polution (P), Smoker (S ), Cancer (C ), XRay (X ) and
Dyspnoea (D). The table associated with each variable is called Conditional Probability Table
(CPT), encoding the conditional probability distribution of the variable given its parents. The
joint probability distribution of the five variables can be written as
p(P, S,C,X,D) = p(P )P (S)p(C|P, S)p(X|C)p(D|C). (2.2)
As the conditional probability distribution can be calculated from the joint probability, a
Bayesian network consisting of a class variable and feature variables is readily applicable to
the classification task. Take the lung cancer network as an example, if we choose Cancer (C )
as the class variable (value unobserved), we can compute the probability of C = T given any
observed value set (p, s, x, d) as
p(C = T |p, s, x, d) = p(C = T, p, s, x, d)
p(C = T, p, s, x, d) + p(C = F, p, s, x, d)
,
where p(C = T, p, s, x, d) and p(C = F, p, s, x, d) can be computed efficiently using Eq.(2.2).
Similarly, we can compute p(C = F |p, s, x, d). Then we decide the value of C by comparing
p(C = F |p, s, x, d) and p(C = T |p, s, x, d). Note that this is a binary classification, easily
generalized to multi-class classification by comparing the conditional probabilities of all values
of the class variable.
The Bayesian network structure and its associated CPDs can be specified with the help
of domain knowledge, e.g., the lung cancer network. However, in most cases, the network
structures and CPDs are unknown due to the lack of domain knowledge. In these cases, a
Bayesian network classifier can be learned from training data. The learning process contains
structural learning and conditional probability distribution estimation. In structural learning,
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Figure 2.1: A simple example of Bayesian network: Lung cancer network.
a scoring metric is employed to evaluate the fitness of a structure in relation to the training
data. Then, a search method is applied to find a good model [63] among possible structures.
Since the number of possible structures is super-exponential with respect to the number of
variables, finding the optimal structure is NP-hard [15]. Thus, some heuristic or approximate
methods, such as greedy search, are used. However, the model structures selected in this way
are often suboptimal. After the structure is constructed, the CPDs can be efficiently estimated
using well-developed statistical methods such as Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) or
Bayesian Estimation [33].
2.2.2 Bayesian Model Averaging of Bayesian Network Classifiers
Regardless of types of the search methods used, these search methods suffer from the lack
of distinguishability of scoring metrics when the training data is sparse, i.e., the size of the
dataset is small relative to the number of variables. In this case, there can be many distinct
Bayesian networks fitting the training data equally well. Thus, using a single Bayesian network
potentially leads to poor predictions on future data.
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A promising solution to alleviate this problem is to employ BMA, which provides a princi-
pled approach to the model-uncertainty problem by integrating all possible models weighted by
their respective posterior probabilities. Formally, given a training dataset D and a future data
point x (a realization of the variable set X), we compute the posterior probability of observing
x as
p(x|D) =
∑
G
p(x|G,D)p(G|D), (2.3)
where p(G|D) specifies the posterior probability of a Bayesian network G given the training
data D. p(G|D) can be computed from commonly used scores such as BDe score [25]. Then,
p(x|G,D) can be computed by Eq. (2.2), as the network structure G is fixed in the conditional
setup.
Since computing Eq.(2.3) requires enumerating all possible networks, which is super-exponential
with respect to the number of variables, it is not of practical use. One solution is to approximate
this exhaustive enumeration by using a selected set of model structures in G, i.e.,
p(x|D) ≈
∑
G∈G p(x|G,D)p(G|D)∑
G∈G p(G|D)
.
Dash and Cooper [16] described an efficient solution to BMA for prediction over the set
of Bayesian network structures consistent with a partial ordering and with bounded in-degree.
However, this approach is of limited applicability as it performs model averaging over only
a restricted class of BNs consistent with a particular partial ordering. Thus, only a small
portion of probability density can be accounted for. Tian et al. [58] proposed to find the
k-best Bayesian network structures and use them to approximately compute p(h|D), i.e., the
posterior probability of any hyperthesis h. They implemented this idea to address the problem
of structure discovery in BNs, i.e., computing p(f |D), the posterior probability of the presence of
any structural feature f . (e.g., an edge, in BN structures). They showed that the approximation
achieved reasonable accuracy and outperformed the classical sampling methods such as MCMC
[18] for structure discovery in BNs. In this study, we employ this idea to address the problem
of model averaging for prediction (classification). We select the k-best Bayesian networks
G1, ..., Gk, and use them to approximately compute p(x|D) as shown in Eq.(2.4),
p(x|D) ≈
∑k
i=1 p(x|Gi, D)p(Gi|D)∑k
i=1 p(G
i|D) . (2.4)
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Once p(x|D) is computed, we could build a classifier to predict the value of any class variable
as shown in Section 2.2.1. When k = 1, we select the best Bayesian network and use this single
network to build a classifier. Thus, it is a special case of BMA.
2.2.3 Finding the k-best Bayesian Network Structures
In previous sections, we mentioned that the optimal model selection is an NP-hard problem,
as the number of possible model structures is super-exponential with respect to the number of
variables. Thus, in existing applications of Bayesian network classifiers, heuristic or approxi-
mate methods are employed to find the models which are usually suboptimal. Silander et al.
proposed a dynamic programming (DP) algorithm which is capable of finding the globally op-
timal Bayesian network in O(n2n) time [53]. Tian et al. [58] extended the DP algorithm to find
the top k Bayesian network structures. They demonstrated the applicability of the algorithm
on networks with up to 20 variables. One nice feature of their method is that the estimation
accuracy can be improved monotonically by spending more time to compute for larger k.
In this study, we employ this algorithm to select the k-best Bayesian network structures. We
then estimate the CPDs using Bayesian Estimation for each of the k-best network structures
that result in k discrete Bayesian network classifiers. Afterwards, we build our BNMA classifier
by averaging the prediction results over the k-best Bayesian network classifiers.
In detail, we use 12 observed feature variables from the KDD Cup 99 dataset and 1 unob-
served variable representing intrusion or not intrusion. We get the k-best Bayesian Network
structures by running the software tool called KBest [58] which is used to compute the posterior
probabilities of features by Bayesian model averaging over the k-best Bayesian networks. Inside
of this tool package, it computes the local scores for all the families of each variable. With a
selected k value, the software tool of KBest takes a file of data records as input and outputs
the k best network structures and lists the estimated posterior probabilisties for each of the k
best networks based on the input data.
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2.3 Description of NSL-KDD Dataset
In previous IDS research, KDD Cup 99 dataset has been widely used to help build and
evaluate these systems [4] [63] [3] [17]. This database contains a standard set of data to be
audited, which includes a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military network environ-
ment. However, KDD Cup 99 has two major issues that highly affect the assessment of the
performance of evaluated systems [57]. The first deficiency in KDD Cup 99 dataset is the huge
number of redundant records in the training dataset. This deficiency will cause learning algo-
rithms to be biased towards more frequent records. The second deficiency is that the existence
of repeated records in the test set will cause the evaluation results to be biased towards favoring
the methods with better detection rates on frequent records.
In our experiment, we use the NSL-KDD [57] dataset, a new version of KDD Cup 99
dataset consisting of selected records of the complete KDD Cup 99 dataset with redundant and
repeated records removed. As can be seen from the literature [57], the original KDD Cup 99
dataset is skewed and unproportionately distributed, training and testing directly on the KDD
Cup 99 dataset can result in relatively high accuracy rate for different methods, making it
difficult to effectively compare different classifiers. Using this NSL-KDD dataset for evaluation
is more objective and judicial as it does not suffer from either of the two problems mentioned
above. The NSL-KDD dataset contains a training set with 125,973 records and a testing set
with 22,544 records. Each of the datasets contain 41 attributes describing different features of
the connection and a class label assigned to each either as attack or as normal.
2.4 Construction and Evaluation of BNMA Classifier
In this section, we introduce how we construct and evaluate the BNMA classifier. Figure 2.2
illustrates the process from data processing to classifier training and evaluation. The whole
process is elaborated in the following steps:
1. Download NSL-KDD dataset and select a subset out of a total 41 features as the variables
for classifier building.
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2. Randomly sample partial datasets of varying sizes from the overall NSL-KDD training
dataset as the training sets. The whole NSL-KDD testing dataset is then used as the
testing set.
3. Perform data discretization on the continuous features in training and testing datasets
using the information-preserving discretization method.
4. Find the k-best Bayesian network structures using the training dataset, and estimate
the CPDs for each networks using Bayesian Estimation. This results in k independent
Bayesian network classifiers.
5. Combine the k Bayesian network classifiers into a Bayesian classifier using BMA.
6. Apply the Bayesian classifier to the testing dataset, calculate the accuracy and Area
Under ROC (AUC).
7. Conduct four groups of experiments by repeating steps 2-6 using different training sets.
The results for each classifier and each configuration of different size are then averaged
over those four groups of experiments.
In the upcoming subsections, we give details on the process of feature selection, data dis-
cretization, and classifier training and evaluation.
2.4.1 Feature Selection
Feature selection is an indispensable pre-processing step when training a huge dataset with
many features. Extraneous features not only add burden to the computation but also confound
the detection process. The NSL-KDD dataset contains 41 features, some of which may be
redundant and contribute less than the others to the detection process. Feature selection and
feature deduction have been a very popular topic in intrusion detection field for identifying
important input features to build computationally efficient and effective IDS. Singh & Silakari
[54] proposed an ensemble approach for feature selection of the Cyber Attack dataset. Chebrolu
et al. [12], Kayacik et al. [30] and Olusola et al. [46] specifically analyzed the feature relevance
on the KDD Cup 99 dataset. In [12], Markov blanket model was used to select the feature
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Figure 2.2: Flowchart illusrating the training and evaluation of BNMA classifier
set and it was shown that a selected set of 12 features can achieve better predictive accuracy
than when the whole set of 41 features is used. Our main focus in this paper is to compare the
methods based on the same datasets with the same feature set, rather than to study the KDD
data. And we are also particularly interested in studying their performance using a carefully
selected representative subset rather than the full features. Therefore, in our experiments we
used the 12 features suggested in [12]. Those features are described in the following Table 2.1.
2.4.2 Data Discretization
As shown in Table 2.1, some of the selected features take continuous values. However,
current implementation of Bayesian network classifiers can only handle discrete values. Thus,
continuous features need to be discretized before being used to build a classifier. On the other
hand, discretization can often make continuous features easier to understand and interpret, and
produce faster learning models. Many learning models have been shown to perform better by
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Table 2.1: List of Selected Features
FEATURE
NAME
DESCRIPTION TYPE
service network service on the destination, e.g.,
http, telnet, etc.
Discrete
src bytes number of data bytes from source to
destination
Continuous
dst bytes number of data bytes from destination
to source
Continuous
logged in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise Discrete
count number of connections to the same host
as the current connection in the past
two seconds
Continuous
srv count number of connections to the same ser-
vice as the current connection in the
past two seconds
Continuous
serror rate % of connections with errors (refer to
the same-host connection)
Continuous
srv serror rate % of connections with errors (refer to
the same-service connection)
Continuous
srv diff host rate % of connections to different hosts Continuous
dst host count sum of connections to the same desti-
nation IP address
Continuous
dst host srv count sum of connections to the same desti-
nation port number
Continuous
dst host diff srv rate the percentage of connections to differ-
ent services, among the connections ag-
gregated in dst host count (32)
Continuous
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discretizing continuous features [36]. Based on our knowledge, there are two types of commonly
used discretization methods in many of the IDS [37] [46] [63], that is, the unsupervised dis-
cretization algorithms, e.g., equal intervals, equal frequencies, and the supervised discretization
algorithms, e.g., maximum entropy discretization, χ2 discretization, CAIM, etc. In our exper-
iment, we adopted a discretization algorithm named CACC [59], which was a a static, global,
incremental, supervised and top-down discretization algorithm. This information-theoretic al-
gorithm extended the idea of contingency coefficient, combined with the greedy method, and
was empirically shown to be promising in terms of accuracy, execution time, etc. Data dis-
cretized using such discretization scheme have much less information loss, thus better represent
the distribution of original data compared to the ones discretized using other unsupervised
discretization methods.
2.4.3 Classifier Training and Evaluation
One purpose of this study is to evaluate the performance of various classifiers with respect
to varying sizes of the training dataset. Thus, we prepare several training datasets containing
500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000, 20000, 30000, 40000 records, respectively. We train and build
a Bayesian classifier from each of the training sets by BMA over the k-best Bayesian network
classifiers as described in Section 2.2. For each training dataset, we build the Bayesian classifier
by setting k to various values. We then evaluate the performance of the classifier with respect
to these different k values. When k = 1, the classifier is equivalent to a single Bayesian network
classifier. The larger k is, the more models are employed for model averaging, which potentially
leads to better predictive power.
We evaluate all classifiers on the same testing dataset. We compute the accuracy as the
percentage of correctly classified records. Note that this is a binary classification problem, i.e.
an attack or normal. A record is classified as an attack if the conditional probability of being
an attack given the observation of other features is greater than 0.5; it is classified as normal
otherwise. In addition to accuracy, we compute AUC as the area under the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve, which is an estimate of the probability that a classifier will rank
a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative instance. Since
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AUC does not depend on the classification threshold used, it is widely recognized as a better
measure than accuracy, which is based upon a single classification threshold.
For comparison, we also build Naive Bayes classifiers and Bayesian network classifiers, which
are selected by using the greedy hill-climbing search method. The training and testing processes
of this two classifiers are executed in the open source software of Weka which is a collection
of machine learning algorithms for solving real-world data mining problems. Weka is written
in Java and runs on almost any platform. The algorithms can either be applied directly to a
dataset or called from user’s own Java code. When we use Weka to train and test the Naive
Bayes classifiers and Bayesian network classifiers, we just need to pass a file of training records
and a file of testing records separately to it and Weka gives detection accuracy and AUC result
based on the input training and testing dataset. We implemented our algorithm of BNMA
classifier and added it to Weka as a new algorithm. With the training dataset, testing dataset
and k-best network structures given by KBest software as input, our implemented classifier can
output the detection accuracy and AUC of using BNMA over the input dataset.
As described before, we repeated the experiment four times on different training and testing
data sets with each training size and k value. We reported the average accuracy and AUC over
the four trainings for each training size and k value. Considering the records of training dataset
and testing dataset are selected randomly from NSL-KDD dataset, the averaged result over
four experiments is more reliable and objective than the result based on one experiment.
2.5 Experimental Results
Figure 2.3 compares the detection accuracy of Naive Bayes (NB), Bayes Network built using
greedy search (BN-Greedy) and the BNMA (k = 1) by size of the training dataset. First, we
observe that the accuracy is approximately a non-decreasing function of training sample size.
This is understandable since a larger training sample usually produces a classifier with better
predictive power. The accuracies of NB and BN-Greedy are comparable to each other, while
the BNMA classifier built using the best Bayesian network (k = 1) is significantly better than
the two classifiers. Further, the BNMA (k = 1) trained classifiers using a small training set
(2000) even outperforms the NB and BN-Greedy classifiers trained using a very large training
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set (40000). The improvement is also significant when AUCs are compared (see Figure 2.4).
This indicates that the BNMA classifier can achieve reasonably good predictive power even
when a small training dataset is used.
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of detection accuracy by size of training set
In another set of experiments, we evaluate the BNMA classifier with respect to various k
values. Table 2.2 compares the detection accuracy by k value and training set size. Table 2.3
compares the AUC by k value and training set size. It is shown that with the increase of k,
both accuracy and AUC increase. AUC has a more obvious increase than accuracy. However,
this improvement is not as significant as that in comparing BNMA (k = 1) with NB and BN-
Greedy. The most significant improvement is in Table 2.3, for sample size 500, where the AUC
jumps from 0.9615 for k = 1 to 0.9733 for k = 200. With the increase of sample size, the
improvement decreases. This demonstrates that the BNMA is particularly effective on small
sample sizes.
To investigate why the predictive power does not change very much with respect to the
variation of the k value, we examine the structures of the top 10 networks produced using a
training set with size 10000. Figure 2.5 illustrates the consensus structure for the 10 structures.
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Table 2.2: Accuracy Comparison by k Value and Size of Training set
Training Set Size k = 1 k = 10 k = 50 k = 100 k = 200
500 92.40% 92.40% 92.40% 92.40% 92.40%
1000 95.43% 95.43% 95.43% 95.56% 95.43%
2000 93.92% 93.97% 93.97% 93.97% 93.97%
5000 96.06% 96.14% 96.11% 96.14% 96.16%
10000 96.43% 96.43% 96.44% 96.47% 96.46%
20000 96.86% 96.86% 96.87% 96.87% 96.87%
30000 96.86% 96.86% 96.85% 96.86% 96.92%
Table 2.3: AUC Comparison by k and Size of Training set
Training Set Size k = 1 k = 10 k = 50 k = 100 k = 200
500 0.9615 0.9706 0.9733 0.9733 0.9733
1000 0.9705 0.9718 0.9728 0.9728 0.9730
2000 0.9738 0.9738 0.9740 0.9744 0.9745
5000 0.9895 0.9898 0.9898 0.9900 0.9900
10000 0.9905 0.9905 0.9905 0.9908 0.9908
20000 0.9928 0.9928 0.9928 0.9928 0.9930
30000 0.9933 0.9933 0.9933 0.9933 0.9933
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of AUC by size of training set
It is surprising that all 10 structures share the same skeleton with minor differences in the
direction of the edges. This indicates that the top structures represent similar distribution, and
thus make similar predictions for new data points. We can speculate that the top 200 structures
may have very similar structure. For comparison, we also depict the Bayesian network structure
learned using greedy hill climbing search method in Figure 2.6. It is easily observed that this
structure is significantly sparser (fewer edges) than the consensus structure in Figure 2.5. This
explains why the structure selected with heuristic method is suboptimal, because it fails to
identify many important dependencies among the feature nodes which can be captured by our
method of using BNMA classifier. It also explains why the best Bayesian network (k = 1) has
significantly better predictive power than the BN-Greedy classifier.
2.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this study we proposed a Bayesian classifier using BMA of k-best Bayesian network
classifiers, called BNMA classifier, for intrusion detection. Previous IDS using Bayesian network
classifier has two problems. First, the Bayesian network structure is selected using heuristic
23
Figure 2.5: A consensus network built from the top 10 networks trained on sample size
10000. The correspondences between the nodes and the features are : 0-service; 1-
src bytes; 2-dst bytes; 3-logged in; 4-count; 5-srv count; 6-serror rate; 7-srv serror rate; 8-
srv diff host rate; 9-dst host count; 10-dst host srv count; 11-dst host diff srv rate; 12-class
(intrusion or not intrusion). Note that the class variable is shadowed. Directed edges existing
in all 10 structures are depicted as solid arrows. The set of edges that exist in all structures
but with various directions are depicted as solid lines.
Figure 2.6: The Bayesian network trained on sample size 10000 using greedy hill climbing
search method. The correspondences between the nodes and the features are the same as those
in Figure 2.5.
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methods, which usually return suboptimal models. Second, previous classifiers are trained and
evaluated using a very large training dataset, which is usually hard to collect within a short
time period. In this study, we used a DP algorithm to find the globally k-best structures and
used them to build a Bayesian classifier by BMA. We showed that the BNMA classifier has
significantly better predictive power than Naive Bayes and the Bayesian network classifier built
using heuristic method. Even the classifier trained using a very small dataset outperforms the
other two classifiers trained using a very large dataset. We then conclude that our BNMA
classifier is particularly effective in detecting intrusions when only a few training records are
available. This is very valuable since prompt detection of intrusion is of significant importance
in such an era of rapidly growing Internet activities.
We also show that with the increase of k, i.e., more Bayesian network classifiers are used
for model averaging, the better predictive power it can achieve. However, this improvement
is not that significant, since the top structures actually share a very similar structure. This
means the problem size (12 feature variables) is still not that large compared to the sample
sizes examined. One question that users may ask is, what is the k value we should use? The
answer is the larger, the better. However, it takes more time to train and integrate over larger
number of classifiers. In this study, we consider 12 feature variables and k = 100 is already
enough. The k value that should be selected depends on the problem size, i.e., the number of
feature variables used to build the model. Thus, our future work is to select a larger set of
feature variables for model building. Since Bayesian network is able to inherently do feature
selection through its conditional dependency assertions, using a larger set of features should
not significantly impact the performance. However, with a larger set of feature variables, it
may need larger k, i.e., integrating over more models to achieve reasonably good predictive
power.
Another area for future work is based on the observation that intrusions happen in dynamic
environments, thus they themselves could be time-series data. An et al. [5] proposed to use
dynamic Bayesian networks to model the temporal environment. However, the problems faced
by the static Bayesian network classifier persist in dynamic Bayesian networks. Thus, it is a
challenge to perform model averaging in the temporal environment setup.
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In summary, since it uses less data while still achieving comparable or better predictive
power, our BNMA classifier can save a huge amount of time on collecting training data records
so that it can catch the intrusion more promptly and more accurately to avoid loss due to
intrusion.
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CHAPTER 3. SITUATIONAL DATA FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
SYSTEM
Abstract
Intrusion detection is a research topic of great importance, especially for web-based appli-
cations, whose broad usage at the same time makes themselves attractive targets for malicious
attackers. Meanwhile, applications of many emerging new web techniques (e.g., Web 2.0,
HTML5, and cloud computing, etc.) add more challenges to intrusion detection. One signifi-
cant issue of building Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is to find an efficient and informative
training data set. In this paper, we proposed a Situational Data Model which is represented by
a sequence of observed situations. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows. First,
we designed Situational Data Model that has better data structure and is more informative.
Each data record is a sequence of situations collected in chronological order. At each time
point, the situation contains a series of information including the context and action for the
possible intrusion, and potential intruder’s desire. Different from action sequences data and
state sequence data, Situational Data makes the training process be able to be performed over
the sequence of punctuated desires which can be inferred from the sequence of actions and con-
texts. The valuable footprints of transition from one situation to another are well captured by
this data collection mechanism. Second, we collected the training data from a real web applica-
tion system Cooperative Research Environment(CoRE) which is developed for research use by
Software Engineer Research Group in the Department of Computer Science at ISU. Our train-
ing data set provides valuable evaluation reference for dynamically intrusion detection system
such as Hidden Markov Model based IDS. Third, we compared our Situational Data against
the data comprised of action sequences data by employing the Hidden Markov Model, and the
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result approves that Situational Data with desires can bring better classification accuracy and
ROC curve.
Key Words: Intrusion detection system, Situ, Hidden Markov Model, detection accuracy,
ROC
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we introduce the Situational Data Model for building dynamic intrusion
detection system. This Situational Data Model is based on the Situ framework introduced
by Chang et al. [11], and is defined by situational data consisting of environmental context
information, activities, and inferred desires.
Traditionally, there are two categories of intrusion detection systems, i.e., either misuse-
based or anomaly-based. A misused-based intrusion detection system includes a number of
attack descriptions or signatures trained from abnormal data. It gives intrusion alert whenever
a stream of audited data matches with an attack model. On the other hand, an anomaly-
based intrusion detection system relies on models trained from the normal data. Deviations of
audited data from established models are interpreted as potential attacks [42]. Training data
are usually collected from network, operating systems, or application log files. Various data
sets are used in building all different kinds of intrusion detection systems. Through training
on historical data, a model explaining the relationship between intrusion and selected features
can be built. The established model is then used to predict outcomes for future audited data.
For instance, Kruegel and Toth [39] created a decision tree to detect malicious events, based
on a set of signatures of data constraints. Altwaijry [2] developed a na¨ıve Bayesian classifier
to identify possible intrusions. To evaluate an intrusion detection system, the public KDD
Cup 1999 dataset [31] has been widely used by the researchers for experiments in the literature
[14, 63]. This dataset contains 41 feature variables and up to 4 million staggering records. Also,
the feature variables of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset include network traffic information such as
src bytes (number of data bytes from source to destination), dst bytes (number of data bytes
from destination to source), and protocol type (type of protocol), etc. The classical approaches
28
typically first train a model based on selective features using a certain amount of data, then
predict a future data record to be intrusive or normal based on the trained model. However,
one common limitation of all those training data is that they only have static network traffic
data, and do not take into account the dynamic nature of many features that may change over
time. This may be partly due to that their feature values were collected statically without
any time stamp. Therefore, they treat all different features being time-independent and ignore
potential temporal relationships between the same features at different time points. In fact, the
dynamic transitions of features’ value in chronical order often carry important information, and
can be very valuable for detecting the intrusions. For example, under statistic data structure, a
potential anomalous behavior that repeatedly have massive amount of data bytes flowing from
source to a destination at different time periods may not be distinguishable from a normal
behavior with similar situation at a single time point. In this case, it may be very challenging
for us to catch the intrusion if we just model the static context information in spite of the
features being time dependent.
Dynamic features have been shown to be more efficient than static features. In fact, some
researchers have been using sequential data for training intrusion detection models. For in-
stance, Ariu et al. [7] designed the intrusion detection system HMMPayl, which uses the Hid-
den Markov Model to analyze the HTTP payload, to detect attacks against Web applications.
Those authors expressed the payload as a sequence of bytes and showed that the HMMPayl
is very effective against attacks like Cross Site Scripting [22] and SQL-Injection [35], whose
payload would not be significantly different from that of normal traffics. On the other hand,
the detection system proposed by Chen et al. [13] analyzed multiple logs from cloud to extract
the intention of the actions recorded in the logs. In their work, the Hidden Markov Model
was adopted to model the sequence of actions performed by hackers. Such stealthy events in
a long time frame is significantly more useful for training the state-aware model. Besides, in
[27], sequences of systems calls were used to build the classification schema. However, all those
sequential features and data used in their IDS training do not have the human internal mental
states (desires) involved. Human desires which could be driven from other features are more
correlated to or more representative of human’s intention than those features. In this thesis, we
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propose a situational data model with actions, contexts of target web application system and
desires of human. We collect and parse the data following the Situ framework [11]. That is, we
represent each data record as a sequence of situations, of which each contains three components
– desire, action, and context. We then compare Situational Data Set with action-only sequences
dataset using the Hidden Markov Model. Our experiment result shows that situational dataset
is more effective by having the training process guided by human desires.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the related work
Hidden Markov Model and Situ Framework. Section 3.3 describes the Situational Data Model
and the process of Situational dataset collection. Section 3.4 gives our experiment design and
results. Finally, we conclude in Section 3.5 with a summary of the current work and a discussion
of potential future work.
3.2 Related Work
3.2.1 Hidden Markov Model
A hidden markov model (HMM) is a statistical model representing probability distributions
over a sequence of observations, say {x1, . . . , xT }, accompanied by hidden states {y1, . . . , yT }
[21]. As a simple dynamic Bayesian network model, a HMM can be illustrated by Figure 3.1, and
there are two defining properties: hidden, in the sense that all observations {xt, t = 1, . . . , T} are
assumed to be generate by some process whose states {y1, . . . , yT } are hidden; Markov property,
in the sense that the distribution of those hidden states have markov property, i.e., at any time
point t, the distribution of yt given all its history y1, . . . , yt−1 is equivalent to that of yt given yt−1
only. In addition, the conditional distribution of any the observations xt given all other nodes
of the graph is the same as its conditional distribution given its immediate parent yt. Bringing
those markov properties together, the joint distribution of (X,Y ) = (x1, . . . , xt, y1, . . . , yt) can
be written as
p(X,Y ) =
T∏
t=1
p(xt | yt)p(yt | yt−1),
where we adopt the convention that y0 represents null status with no information.
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Figure 3.1: Hidden Markov Model
HMMs have been widely used in the literature for researches in different disciplines, e.g.,
economics, computer science, etc. HMM is also very often used in intrusion detection [7, 13, 27].
In applications, typically a parametric model is assumed for the joint distribution of p(X,Y )
such that p(X,Y ) = p(X,Y ; θ), and the goal of learning task is to obtain an estimator for
θ based on observed outcomes X = (x1, . . . , xT ). Intuitively, because Y = (y1, . . . , yT )
are hidden, i.e., unobserved, θ may be estimated by the marginal distribution of X, i.e.,
p(X; θ) =
∑
y1,...,yT
p(X,Y ; θ). However, obtaining the marginal distribution may be chal-
lenging in practice and computation can be intensive using this brute-force approach. Never-
theless, in the literature efficient computational algorithms are available, e.g., E-M algorithm
based Baum-Welch method [45], among others. In our discussion here, we use HMM model as
a candidate method for comparing the effectiveness of Situational Dataset with another dataset
in training Intrusion Detection System and classifying intruders and normal users. Details re-
garding how HMM is applied in our setting and how HMM is to be combined with the Situ
framwork will be introduced in the upcoming discussions and section.
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Figure 3.2: Situ Framework
3.2.2 Situ Framework
The data records used for training and prediction is modeled following the Situ Framework.
Situ Framework [11] originally provides a situation-theoretic approach to human-intention-
drive service evolution in context-aware service environments. The situation defined in this
framework is rich in semantics and useful for capturing human thinking and behavioral patterns,
which, in turn, help developers to construct the intention specification. Figure 3.2 from [11]
shows the situation-theoretic intention-driven framework for service evolution at runtime.
In Situ framework [11], a human intention is defined as temporal sequence of situations to
achieve a goal, which is described as I = seq(S1, S2, . . . , Sk) where S1, . . . , Sk are goal-directed
situations for the goal g. A situation at time t is expressed as situation (t). It is a triple
{d,A,E} in which d is the predicted users desire, A is a set of the users actions to achieve a
goal which d corresponds to, and E is a set of environment context values with respect to a
subset of the context variables at time t. As shown in Figure 3.2, an intention plays a proactive
role in interpreting human actions, which are the key component connecting desires and specific
contexts. The contexts are derived from sensing the entire environment surrounded by a user
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being observed in a service system. This type of contexts such as time, location and so on is
helpful in understanding the triggers and effects of human’s actions. The actions are derived
from human behaviors which interact with contexts bidirectionally. Situ is a higher level formal
mechanism to understand human intention change by the situations.
3.3 Situational Data for Intrusion Detection
3.3.1 Definition of Situational Data Model for Intrusion Detection
In previous intrusion detection researches, the KDD Cup 1999 dataset has been widely used
to build and evaluate the Intrusion Detection System [14, 63]. The KDD Cup 1999 dataset [57]
include many relevant features such as connection, traffic, and content, etc. However, all of
those features are static, in that no time stamps are associated with those features that could
potentially change over time. Therefore, a potential layer of correlation or connection between
those features is missing. In other words, features collected at two different time points, say t1
and t2, are treated as two entirely independent records regardless of their time stamp. We call
those type of data as static data. In a static data model, the over-time trajectory of features
are not collected thus cannot be used in training or utilized to predict audited data in the
future.
When only static data are used for training, it is very difficult to detect malicious attacks
that have similar network traffic features as normal behaviours, e.g., SQL injections. This
naturally motivates making use of training data that can capture not just statistic features but
also dynamic characteristics. For instance, sequential data that are collected with time stamps
would help counter this challenge. In fact, sequential data have already been frequently used
in the literature. For example, Ariu et al. [7] defined each data record as a sequence of payload
bytes length collected at different time points. While this data model captures the payload
bytes length in a sequential manner for intrusion detection, it is, however, not effective for
detecting attacks that do not cause significant payload changes over different time points. For
illustration, we can think of a simple example where a brute-force type attack is considered.
Specifically, suppose an attacker repeatedly tries to log-in by guessing passwords without being
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successful. In this case, the payload bytes length at each of those attempts will not differ much
from each other, thus the system will probably fail to detect this attack.
Given reasons above, we believe that it can be more effective for intrusion detection if we
consider not only the change of general context, e.g., payload byte length, but also other factors
such as sequences of users’ behaviors and thinking patterns. Following this thought, we build
our Situational Data model based on the Situ framework [11]. According to the correlations of
intention, desires, context, and actions described in Situ, we design our Situational Data model
with three layers as shown in Figure 3.3. Specifically, let t1, . . . , tn be data collection time points
in natural chronical order. The first layer represents action and context sequences, denoted
by [A1, C1], . . . , [An, Cn]. Then the second layer captures the desire sequence, d1, . . . , dn. The
third layer gives the temporal intention sequence tempI1, . . . , tempIn. A user’s footprint left
in the system is expressed as a sequence of situations, say, S1, . . . , Sn. Each situation St at
time point t consists of [At, Ct], dt and tempIt, where [At, Ct] is the set of actions and context
observed at time t, dt is the user’s desire on the system at time t, and tempIt is a quantitative
value indicating the degree of the segmental attacking intention for the desire at time t. A
user’s intention is then composed of a sequence of situations.
For intrusion detection purposes, one of the key components of the Situational Data Model is
the desire layer which plays a central role as a bridge in the process of inferences in classification.
It helps find hidden relationships among those trivial context and behavior information, then
help correlate them with users’ temporal intentions. It guides the predictive model with clearer
direction on classifying intruders and normal users. When attackers have malicious intentions,
they tend to plan and execute the attack step by step. Using a metaphor to illustrate the
relationship among actions, environment context, human desires, and intention in a system, we
can think of the preparations a smart robbery might do after he decides to rob. The intention
of rob drives him to have some temporal desires such as avoiding to be recognized, avoiding
to be recorded by camera, confirming no polices around, and so on. Those temporal desires
then drive him to have some actions and context information like wearing sun glasses, wearing
a mask, observing possible cameras, and so on, leading to a abnormal sequences of actions and
environment context. The same for attacking computer systems, a user with malicious intention
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Figure 3.3: Situational Data Model
must have attacking-driven desires at some of the time points in the situation sequence. Those
desires will then drive the attackers to learn vulnerabilities and information about the target
system before he is able to intrude eventually. During the process of learning vulnerabilities
and trying attack, the attackers would have abnormal behaviors, which make the environment
context different from that of normal users’.
To use this Situational Data Model, we need to train two prediction models. The first model
is a desire model for predicting the desire sequence based on action and context sequences. The
other model is an intention model for predicting temporal intention by desire sequences. When
IDS is used to predict and detect intrusion, firstly we treat action and context sequences, i.e.,
[A, C], as observed data and desire sequences as hidden state data to be predicted. Secondly,
the predicted desire sequences from the desire model will be used as input of the intention
model for predicting the temporal intention sequences. Finally, the trained IDS can classify an
intention to be normal or malicious according to the values of the temporal intention sequence
tempI1, . . . , tempIn.
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3.3.2 SQL Injection
In this subsection, we briefly describe one of the intrusion techniques used by assumed
intruders in our data collection platform, i.e., CoRE. We explain how SQL injection happen
since it is most frequently used by our assumed intruders.
In web based applications, when normal users submit their input information on the client
side, the input value will be combined by a SQL statement written by programmers. For
instance, suppose a normal user enters marcus as the username and secret as the password in
the log-in page from the client side. The web-based application will interpret it in the way that
is described by the following SQL statement:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’marcus’ and password = ’secret ’
Subsequently, this statement will search the user database and retrieve all relevant information
that matches the user name marcus and password secret.
When a malicious user intrudes the system using the SQL injection technique, the main
idea is to bypass the above user name and password check by injecting some input values
that can turn the above concatenated SQL statement into an always-true statement regardless
of the actual user name and password provided. This is because the website log-in program
is written in such a way that it interprets log-in information by combining the phrases from
“username” and “password” fields in the SQL statement, in the same way as the example
shown in the previous paragraph. As a result, because the SQL statement is true, the log-in
system will then grant access to the intruder. For example, suppose an attacker knows the
database administrator’s user name, admin. Then the attacker may capitalize on this and use
this information in the log-in page by entering the username admin’–. This input will then
generate a SQL statement as follows:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’admin’- -’ and password = ’anything ’
Note the sign ′ − −′ is an annotation mark in SQL syntax, thus all the following statement
after the ′ − −′ will be regarded as potential annotations of the SQL statement. As a result,
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the above SQL statement is actually equivalent to the following statement:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’admin’,
which is true as admin is an admin’s username as aforementioned. In other words, no matter
what value of password is provided in this case, the SQL statement is always true and the
program will then respond with information associated with the username admin. Meanwhile,
this also means that an attacker can use any username from the database and apply this
technique to bypass the log-in page.
According to this SQL injection attack technique, the actions users did on the web site
usually cause some database operations like select, delete, and so on, in the back end side
of the application. The input information are actually used as parameters for the back end
operation. The response type of URL request is the feedback that we got after the back end
operation is done. We gathered those information on time stamps for our Situational Data Set
which helps us to find the real intention of the users.
3.3.3 Collection of Situational Data for Intrusion Detection
We collect our Situational Data Set based on the real dynamic web application system, Co-
operative Research Environment (CoRE), which is used for sharing published and unpublished
internal research papers, comments and ideas, etc. This system is modified from an open-
source web application called MyReview [48] by the Software Engineer Lab in the Department
of Computer Science at Iowa State University. The CoRE is used as an online library system
by scholars at Iowa State University. Upon logging in the system by assigned user name and
password, a user is able to upload papers, download papers, write comments, view comments,
and search by key words, etc. A sketch of different functionalities of this system is displayed
in Figure 3.4.
Before the experiment was conducted, an approval was obtained from our Institutional
Review Board (IRB) due to its involvement of human subjects. Our experiment complies
with the federal regulations set forth by the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Food and Drug Administration. In addition, all principal investigators in this experiment
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Figure 3.4: Cooperative Research Environment System
took the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Web-based training course Protecting Human
Research Participants before their participation in the experiment. A total of approximately 120
participants, including normal users and assumed intruders, have contributed to this experiment
study, where normal users used the CoRE system normally, and assumed intruders performed
as intruders to attack the system using different attacking skills.
We collect the participants’ actions, e.g., clicking different functional buttons and URLs,
and the context information of the system, e.g., input information in text box of the web site
and HTTP response type after sending a URL request. To capture users’ actions and related
context information of the system, a monitor program is embedded in the CoRE system as
a sensor. We also collect users’ desires each time when they have actions on the system.
The participants’ desires are collected by the “think-aloud” method, which is a questionnaire
embedded in the system. Participants choose or enter their desires at different time points
during the process of using the system. When the Situational Data Model is used in practice,
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those desires cannot be collected from users thus they need to be manually labeled. In this data
collection, we manually label temporal intentions based on the actions and context information.
As shown in the Table 3.1, we collected data records, including actions, contexts, and
desires, at 8645 different time stamps, of which 6880 were generated by normal users and 1765
were generated by assumed intruders. Meanwhile, if we look at those records from situation
sequence point of view, there are a total of 462 sequences, consisting of 365 normal sequences
and 97 malicious sequences.
Table 3.1: Data summary
Normal Malicious Total
Number of Records 6880 1765 8645
Number of Sequences 365 97 462
On the other hand, in terms of numbers of distinct values, our data contain 66 possible
actions, 3 types of URL request errors or exceptions, 8 types of information inputs, 33 types
of desires, and 7 possible temporal intention values. The malicious intention set includes SQL-
injection attack, unauthorized url retries, authentication attack, etc. All possible values of
intention, temporal intention, and contexts are given in the following:
I = {malicousI, normalI}
tempI = {0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10}
Context = {No Error, Error Remind, Error Report, Legal Input, No Input,
Legal Input, Sql Input, Inserted Link, Url Action, UrlGuessInput, Url PaperID}.
All possible values of actions and desires are shown in Table 3.2.
For illustration purpose, let us consider a simple example of situation sequences presented
in Table 3.3, which is a subset of a user’s records in our collected data from CoRE. Each
row of this table is a situation, including values of action, context, and desire at a time point
t (t = 1, . . . , 10). The user behaved normally in situations S1 and S2. From situation S3 to
situation S6, the user made two attempts logging into the system illegally using SQL injection
techniques. Following that, starting from situation S7 until situation S10, the user tried to
39
Table 3.2: Possible values of action and desire
Action Desire
clickMenuMyProfile clickSendInstruction Test
clickMenuHome clickMenuConfigSystem ViewAllPapers
clickMenuSignin clickUploadPaper Log In
clickSignup clickDownloadAllPapers ViewAPaperInfo
clickLogin clickSubmitEditPaper DownloadPaper
clickMenuListUsers clickLinkPrintMyComments ViewMyPapers
clickLinkModify clickSubmitPreQuestion Get User Names
clickModify clickCancelMyProfile UploadPaper
clickEditMyProfile clickHideSelection ViewProfile
clickUpdateMyProfile clickShowSelection ViewHomepage
Null clickCancelSubmitComment SubmitComment
clickSkipPreQuestion clickCancelUploadPaper View All Papers
clickMenuAllPapers clickFilter FilterPapers
clickRemoveCommentMyPapers clickPaperInfosMyComments ViewMyComments
clickOkRemoveComment clickPaperInfosMyPapers ViewMyCommentInfo
clickMenuMyPapers clickDownloadMyPapers ViewMyPaperInfo
clickMenuMyComments clickSubmitEditComment EditPaper
clickEditPaperMyPapers clickEditCommentMyPapers EditComment
tryURL clickCancelPostQuestion Guess Password
clickPaperInfosAllPapers clickCancelEditPaper EditProfile
clickEndSession clickCancelEditComment RemoveComment
clickMenuSignout clickEditCommentAllPapers Sign Up
clickEditCommentMyComments clickSubmitMyProfile Register Illegal User
clickLinkRemoveMember clickCommentMyPapers Skip Login
clickOkRemoveMember clickICSE Modify User Information
clickMenuUploadPaper clickFairUse Access Page Unauthorized
clickCommentUploadPaper clickEditPaperAllPapers Search Administrator Content
clickSubmitComment click(Link EditPaper) Access Paper Unauthorized
clickSubmitCommentAllPapers clickEditPaperMyComments Remove User
clickLinkAddNewAccount clickDownloadMyComments Create User
clickAddNewAccount clickSendPsw SendMaliciousLink
clickNoRemoveComment clickRemoveCommentMyComments clickLinkPrintMyComments
clickLinkSendInstruction clickContact clickSubmitComment
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modify the database by removing certain users and tried to send malicious links to the existing
users in the database. This is an intrusion example with very obvious intrusion intention
that could be easily detected. For many other smart intruders, we may not be able to collect
situation sequences with such obvious patterns. For instance, they may switch frequently
between behaving normally and abnormally alternatively to hide their intrusion intentions.
Table 3.3: An example sequence of Situational data set
Situ Action Input Error Type Desire tempI
S1 clickSkipPreQuestion No Input No Error Test 0
S2 clickMenuSignin No Input No Error Login 0
S3 clickLogin Sql Input Error Remind Skip Login 1
S4 clickLogin Sql Input Error Remind Skip Login 2
S5 clickLogin Sql Input Error Remind Skip Login 4
S6 clickLogin Sql Input No Error Skip Login 7
S7 clickLinkRemoveMmber No Input No Error Remove User 1
S8 clickOkRemoveMember No Input No Error Remove User 2
S7 clickLinkRemoveMmber No Input No Error Remove User 4
S8 clickOkRemoveMember No Input No Error Remove User 7
S9 clickLinkSendInstruction No Input No Error SendMalicousLink 1
S10 clickSendInstruction No Input No Error SendMaliciousLink 2
Although the situational data set under our discussion is collected based on target system
domains, the methodology we proposed can assist in building IDS for any systems. When
researchers or practitioners collect data to build their IDS, actions and context can be captured
automatically and desires and temporal intentions need to be labeled manually. On the other
hand, data set may be collected from different web applications or platforms, nevertheless
they can be shared and combined as long as they have similar components based on intrusion
detection investigation features. For example, we can build one IDS that is applicable for some
commercial web sites specially and build another one for some financial web sites specially.
Because the collected data can be used across different platforms, it is relatively easy for us to
maintain and update the training data set for improving detection performance and handling
possible new attack patterns.
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3.4 Evaluation of Situational Data for IDS by HMM
Recall that our objective in this chapter is to evaluate our Situational Data Model compared
to conventional data with action sequences only. Specifically, we apply the HMM model on data
consisting of only action sequences and data under the Situational Data Model. To proceed,
we first provide details regarding our experiment setup and descriptions of software for training
HMM in Section 3.4.1, then we discuss results in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Description of Experiment
For simplicity, let us denote the data set corresponding to action sequences only as A, and
the data set with sequences of situations as B. For each of the two data sets, we partition the
data into training set and testing set first, then generate another validation set independently.
Specifically, we use stratified sampling such that a simple random sampling framework is applied
and is stratified by normal sequences and malicious sequences, such that similar portions of
malicious records in each of the training and testing sets can be obtained. In our experiment,
we use 50-50 split of the entire data, such that 50% of the sequences will be randomly selected
to serve as the training set with the rest serving as the testing set. A random number generator
seed is selected such that results are reproducible. The validation set is then independently
sampled from the entire data containing similar number of sequences as the training or testing
data, i.e., 50% of the sequences. In general, we use the training set to train an HMM model
and obtain an IDS, the validation set to select decision thresholds and the test set to compare
performance.
As we discussed in Section 3.2.1, a parametric model p(X,Y ; θ) is often adopted for HMM
model, where X are observed data and Y are hidden state variables. Let X and Y be sets
of all possible distinct values of X and Y , respectively. To implement HMM, we adopt the
jahmm package [20], which uses the Baum-Welch algorithm. Before it can be run, this java
package needs to have observations and initial estimates of parameters in an HMM model.
Those parameters and their estimates of initial values are described below.
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• {pi(y) | y ∈ Y}: Marginal probability distributions of the hidden state variables at starting
time point. For each potential value, say y, of a hidden state variable, its initial value can
be estimated by evaluating the proportion of sequences whose initial hidden state value
is y.
• {piyi, yj | yi, yj ∈ Y}: Transition probability matrix of all possible values of a hidden state
variable. For the transition probability from y1 to y2, this initial value can be calculated
by counting the proportion of transition records y1 → y2 out of all transition records
y1 → anything.
• {pix|y | x ∈ X , y ∈ Y}: Conditional probabilities of an observed variable taking a partic-
ular value, say x, given each possible value of a hidden state variable, say y. The initial
value of this parameter can be estimated by calculating the proportion of records that
link hidden state variable’s value y and observed variable’s value x among all records that
have hidden state value being y.
When an HMM model using jahmm finishes running, the output contains final estimates
of all the aforementioned parameters. In addition, it also includes the most probable outcome
for each observed data Y . In our cases, the hidden state is temporal intention, with values
ranging from 0 to 10. Note that those values do not directly translate into whether an ob-
servation corresponds to a normal or malicious intention. There are many possible ways to
utilize the predicted temporal intention values for classification purpose. We use the average
value of the predicted sequence, that is, suppose a predicted sequence of temporal intentions
are tempI1, . . . , tempIT , then we use
avg.tempI = T−1
T∑
t=1
tempIt. (3.1)
A large value of avg.tempI indicates high intention of being malicious. Therefore, our decision
rule based on predicted temporal intension is simply
ψ(γ) = I{avg.tempI > γ},
where γ is a threshold value, and a sequence will be classified into being malicious if ψ(γ) = 1
and normal otherwise. For the choice of threshold value γ, we will use the validation data to
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select a γ such that some pre-specified criteria will be satisfied with desirable performance. For
instance, we can check the accuracy of prediction, i.e., the proportion of sequences, including
both malicious and normal sequences, that are correctly classified, and select the γ∗ that
maximizes accuracy. Apply this selected γ∗ to the test data, and compare performance of
different methods based on accuracy or other similar criteria. We give more details of evaluation
criteria and threshold determination in the upcoming section.
For data set A where only action sequences are used, it is straightforward to apply the above
HMM model by using action sequences as observed data X, and temporal intensions as hidden
state variables Y . When our Situational Data Model (see Section 3.3.3 for more details) is used,
i.e., data set B is concerned, we apply the HMM twice through a two-step procedure. In the
first step, in addition to the action sequence, we also consider context sequences. Meanwhile,
we consider the desire as a hidden state, and in the first step, the goal is to train a model that
predicts desires based on action and context sequences. Note that in our training data, we
have desires provided by participants. Following this step, we train another HMM model by
treating desire sequences as observed data and temporal intention sequences as hidden state
data. When the trained IDS model is used on the testing data set, we first predict the desire
based on the model we built in the first step, then use the predicted desire in our trained model
obtained in the second step to further predict the temporal intention sequence. We leave details
of their comparisons in the upcoming discussion.
3.4.2 Experiment Results
To compare performance of the HMM applied to sequence of actions and the HMM applied
to sequence of situations, we introduce the following measurements. Specifically, we consider
accuracy, i.e., proportion of correctly classified outcomes; false positive rate, i.e., proportion
of misclassified normal sequences; true positive rate, i.e., proportion of correctly classified
malicious sequences, and ROC curve. In mathematical notations, without loss of generality, we
can assume that the first n sequences are normal and the rest N − n sequences are malicious,
and let δi be the classification rule of sequence i, i = 1, . . . , N , such that δi = 1 indicates that
sequence i is classified as being malicious or normal otherwise (δi = 0). Then the accuracy
44
(ACC), false positive rate (FPR), and true positive rate (TPR) are defined as follows:
ACC =
∑n
i=1(1− δi) +
∑N
i=n+1 δi
N
, (3.2)
FPR =
∑n
i=1 δi
n
, (3.3)
TPR =
∑N
i=n+1 δi
N − n . (3.4)
For any intrusion detection method, an associated threshold γ for a decision instrument, e.g.,
posterior probability of being malicious, is typically selected to form a decision rule. And for
each decision rule, based on the results, ACC, FPR and TPR can then be evaluated. A ROC
curve would be created by collecting all (FPR, TPF) pairs for all possible threshold choices.
Also, for simplicity, we denote the two HMM methods as HMM1 and HMM2 in the following:
HMM1 : HMM method making use of only action sequences;
HMM2 : HMM method making use of Situ sequences.
In Figure 3.6, we display the accuracies of HMM1 and HMM2, where the x-axis is the
threshold value γ. For each of the HMMs, accuracy curves for both validation and test are
shown. As we can see, except minor difference for HMM2, validation and test data exhibit very
similar accuracy curve performance. If we use the accuracy measurement as a guide to select
threshold value for each decision rule, then for HMM1, a threshold γhmm,1 can be selected as
approximately 2.75, leading to about 85% accuracy as its maximum. For HMM2, a threshold
γ ∈ [0.5, 1] results in a maximum accuracy of approximately 95%. Those accuracy curves
show that HMM2 produces better accuracy in terms of both the maximum value and overall
profile. Meanwhile, the shape of the curve with respect the threshold value also makes sense.
In particular, for an extremely small threshold, δi is more likely to be classified into being
malicious, thus majority of δi will be 1. Based on equation (3.2), the accuracy will be close
to 1 − n/N , corresponding to the accuracy under the case when threshold is 0. On the other
hand, when the threshold is extremely large, very little to no sequences may be classified as
being malicious, i.e., majority of δi’s are 0, thus the accuracy measurement will be very close to
n/N . Therefore, the accuracy should increase when the threshold value initially increases from
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0, and reaches its maximum at a certain point then start to drop when the threshold continues
to grow.
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Figure 3.6: Accuracies of HMMs
An alternative approach to compare them is the ROC curve, which consists of all possible
(FPR, TPR) pairs. We show ROC curves for HMM1 and HMM2 in subfigures (a) and (b)
of Figure 3.8, respectively. In terms of ROC curves, the one that has larger area under the
curve, or is closer to top left corner, is deemed to have better performance. This is because,
if we fix the FPR and check the TPR, then the curve that has higher TPR value is better.
This is essentially very similar to hypothesis testing where we control or fix one dimension,
e.g., FPR or type I error, and look at the other TPR or power. Figure 3.8 shows that HMM2
has better ROC curve property than HMM1. That is, if we fix FPR to be around 5%, then
HMM1 gives about 50% FPR, while HMM2 gives about 85% to 90% FPR. We do notice some
visible difference between the ROC curves of validation and test datasets for each of the two
HMM models. Specifically, if we fix FPR, and check the difference between TPRs of validation
and test dataset, the maximum difference is about 6% for HMM1 and about 10% for HMM2.
However, this may not be surprising due to the random variation of sampling.
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Figure 3.8: ROC Curves of HMMs
To link the accuracy figures with the ROC curve figures, we also present the relationship
between threshold values and their corresponding FPR and TPR in Figure 3.10. When the
threshold value is about 2.75 for HMM1, the FPR for both validation and test are controlled
under 5%, however, the TPR is about 48%. That is, even that the accuracy for HMM1 is about
85%, the TPR is still not very ideal. This is because the accuracy measure, i.e., ACC, in (3.2)
can be regarded as a weighted average of FPR and TPR. In fact, ACC can be written as
ACC =
n
N
(1− FPR) + N − n
N
TPR. (3.5)
In our example, because malicious events are relatively rare compared to normal events as
it’s mostly the case in practice, the accuracy measurement puts more weight, i.e., n/N , on
FPR. Now let us examine FPRs and TPRs with respect to threshold values for HMM2. As
mentioned earlier, the accuracy performance is fairly well and stable for a range of threshold
values between [0.5, 1], as reflected in Figure 3.5b. If we take a threshold value of 0.5, then the
associated FPR is controlled under 5%, and the TPR is about 90% for the validation data set
and about 85% for the test data set. This makes the advantage of HMM2 over HMM1 more
visible and pronounced.
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From this exercise, we also see that accuracy may not be the only option to guide the
determination of a threshold value. More broadly speaking, a general weighted version of
accuracy can be proposed as
ACCw = w(1− FPR) + (1− w)TPR.
A threshold can then be selected using the validation data, based on a weighted version of
accuracy measurement.
3.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In summary, we introduce a new data model, i.e., the Situational Data Model, to build an
IDS. We give definition of this model, and elaborate on how this model can be applied in an
HMM framework for intrusion detection. In particular, we describe how the situational data
are collected in real applications, and we run experiments to explore the performance of the
Situational Data Model when compared to the data model that uses only action sequences.
We study with due diligence their accuracy, false discovery rates, false positive rates, and ROC
curves. As we can see from the results, the Situational Data Model outperforms its comparator
and can provide benefits in building more effective IDS. In the next chapter, we will investigate
an alternative machine learning method other than HMM to build IDS, on top of our Situational
Data Model.
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(a) HMM using Action Sequence Only
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Figure 3.10: False Positive Rates and True Positive Rates of HMMs
49
CHAPTER 4. SITUATION AWARE INTRUSION DETECTION
SYSTEM USING CONDITIONAL RANDOM FIELDS
Abstract
In this chapter, we introduce Situation Aware with Conditional Random Field based In-
trusion Detection System (SA-CRF-IDS), where the intrusion analysis is performed by prob-
abilistic graphical models of Conditional Random Fields (CRF) over a sequence of observed
situations. Compared to other similar models, such as Hidden Markov Models (HMM), used
in Intrusion Detection, CRF can represent intrusion problems more comprehensively. In an
HMM, a Markovian assumption is adopted such that any hidden state only conditionally de-
pends on the state from its immediate neighbor at the previous position or time point. This
assumption is effectively relaxed in CRF models, where each hidden state can depend on all its
neighbour hidden states and observations at any of the previous time points. This gives CRFs
more freedom to detect crafty attackers that often hide their footprint by inserting lots of noisy
information when attacking. We compare the CRF and the HMM model on both the sequences
of actions data set and sequences of situation data set. From our experiment result, the CRF
is more effective than HMM for the action-sequence data set. On the other hand, those two
models are very competitive and comparable in detecting intrusion over the situational data
set.
Key Words: Intrusion detection system, Conditional Random Field, Hidden Markov Model,
Detection accuracy, ROC.
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4.1 Introduction
This article introduces a paradigm for building Situation Aware with Conditional Random
Field based Intrusion Detection System (SA-CRF-IDS). The SA-CRF-IDS is used for classi-
fying malicious intention and normal intention by analyzing collected situational data such as
environmental context information, activities, and inferred desires.
Many machine learning approaches have been routinely utilized in intrusion detection. For
instance, Jonathon and Deepti [44] run data mining tools against a log file to detect intrusion.
Chen et al. [14] used Rough Set Theory to select features and applied the Support Vector
Machine method to learn and test based on selected features. Meanwhile, Feshki et al. [19] also
utilized Support Vector Machine as the core component of their proposed system to classify
alerts. In addition, Wee et al. [63] proposed a Bayesian network for the modeling of network
intrusion domain. They also applied the powerful reasoning capabilities of Bayesian network
to detect intrusions. Moreover, Al-Jarrah and Arafat [1] applied principal component neural
networks for recognizing attacks and tested their system in real practice and the DARPA [31]
datasets.
Among all those machine learning methods, Hidden Markov Models (see Section 3.2.1) are
very popular statistical tools for intrusion detection because they are powerful for finding the
hidden and underlying structure of given sequential data. For example, in [27], an HMM was
used for training the intrusion detection model based on system calls sequences. Ariu et al.
[7] designed an intrusion detection system named HMMPayl to detect attacks against web
applications through the analysis of the HTTP payload and Hidden Markov Model. They
represented the payload as a sequence of bytes. On the other hand, the detection system
proposed by Chen et al. [13] analyzed multiple logs from cloud to extract the intension of the
actions. In their work, a Hidden Markov Model was adopted to model sequences of attacks
performed by hackers and such stealthy events in a long time frame will become significant in
the state-aware model. Moreover, Jain and Abouzakhar [28] analyzed the performance of a
Hidden Markov Model and Support Vector Machine for anomaly intrusion detection based on
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the publicly available KDD Cup 1999 dataset. For sequential data sets, HMMs can represent
and model intrusion detection problems better than many of other static approaches.
However, HMMs suffer from several assumptions that may not be realistic in many appli-
cations. Firstly, an HMM adopts the Markov assumption that the next state conditionally
depends only on the current state. This assumption may be unreasonable in intrusion detec-
tion problems when we represent the attacking process as sequences of states and observations.
A sophisticated attacker can intentionally perform normal actions and malicious actions al-
ternately in a staggered fashion to confuse detection. Therefore, in this case it may not be
sufficient to just check the current state to label its succeeding state, because observations
at any earlier time point may also be relevant. Secondly, an HMM assumes that transition
probabilities are independent of actual time points when the transitions take place. Third, an
HMM assumes that observations are statistically independent from each other conditional on
hidden states. This assumption may not be pragmatic in intrusion detection problems where
the features are often associated with each other.
To address the problems mentioned above, we utilize Conditional Random Fields (CRFs)
to build intrusion detection systems. CRFs have been used for intrusion detection in the
literature [23, 51, 9, 47, 56, 62, 52]. However, most of the existing approaches aim to model
the dependency relationships among different features, similarly to aforementioned classical
methods. That is, they did not take full advantage of CRFs to train on sequences of features in
chronical order to build intrusion detection models. Plus, most of the researches only worked on
the KDD Cup 1999 dataset or DARPA 2000 data set, which may not be representative of many
other practical intrusion settings. Therefore, in this paper we want to seize the opportunity to
represent each data record as a sequence of situations, and develop intrusion detection models
that use CRFs to build IDS using situation sequences. With situational data, CRFs can help
us detect malicious intentions based on the footprints of situations.
Our SA-CRF-IDS has two major components. The first component is the situational data
(refer to Section 3.3) collected and parsed following the Situ Framework [11]. The second one
is the classifier based on Conditional Random Fields that can represent intrusion detection
problems more generally than other similar approaches. The working process of the proposed
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SA-CRF-IDS is as follows: Firstly, a sequence of desires is predicted based on the sequence of
actions and context. Secondly, each of those desires is assigned value, i.e., tempI, that reflects
the feasibility of attack at specified time points. Finally, the SA-CRF-IDS classifies each desire
sequence into normal intention or malicious intention. In order to compare a CRF and an
HMM, we run both models on each of the action-only sequences data set and the situational
data set. We then compare their performance by studying their false positive rates, true positive
rates, and ROC curves in intrusion detection, similar to our discussions in Chapter 4.3.2.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces Conditional Random
Fields with more details. Section 3 describes the construction of SA-CRF-IDS. Section 4
illustrates how we conduct our experiment and show what our results are. Section 5 concludes
with a summary and a discussion about some potential future work.
4.2 Conditional Random Fields
As aforementioned, we plan to build our intrusion detection system using CRFs. A CRF is
an undirected graph H, whose nodes correspond to a node set X ∪Y , where X represents a set
of selected features and Y stands for dependent variables of interest. This graph or network
is annotated as a Gibbs distribution with a set of factors φ1(D1), . . . , φT (DT ) such that each
Dt is not a subset of X (i.e., Dt contains information from both X and Y ), where the index
t denotes the position of CRF sequence. The network encodes a conditional distribution as
follows [34]:
P (Y | X) = 1
Z(X)
p(Y,X),
p(Y,X) =
T∏
t=1
φt(Dt),
Z(X) =
∑
Y
p(Y,X),
(4.1)
where Z(X) is the normalizing constant, or partition function, that makes P (Y | X) a valid
probability function. Conditional Random Fields are probabilistic models for computing the
probability P (Y | X) of a possible output Y = (y1, . . . , yT ) given an input X = (x1, . . . , xT ),
which sometimes is also called an observation sequence.
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CRFs have been broadly applied in many research areas and topics. For example, Angrosh
et al. [6] used CRFs to build a supervised learning mechanism for context identification and
sentence classification. Joder et al. [29] introduced the use of CRFs for the audio-to-score
alignment task. Zhang and Gong [65] proposed a method for action categorization with modified
hidden conditional random fields. Shen et al. [50] proposed a sparse hidden dynamic CRF model
for user intent learning from their search session. Among those researches and applications,
a particular CRF that is frequently used across various fields is the linear chain conditional
random field, which can be represented graphically by Figure 4.1 [61, 55, 32]. A linear chain
Figure 4.1: Linear Chain Conditional Random Fields
CRF often defines the following probability models
p(Y | X) = 1
Z(X)
T∏
t=1
exp
{
K∑
k=1
θkfk(yt, yt−1, X)
}
,
Z(X) =
∑
Y
T∏
t=1
exp
{
K∑
k=1
θkfk(yt, yt−1, X)
}
,
(4.2)
where X is a set of input variables that can be observed, Y is a set of output variables that needs
to be predicted, the letter t denotes positions in observation sequence X and label sequence Y ,
and f1, . . . , fK denotes K feature functions defined either from domain knowledge or trained
from the training dataset.
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As a sequential model, a linear chain CRF has some similarities with an HMM, but also
offers several advantages over the HMM. For illustration purpose, we display the graphical rep-
resentative models of an HMM in Figure 4.2 (Note that the CRF is represented in Figure 4.1).
First of all, a CRF allows rich and unconstrained feature representation that could overlap or
refer arbitrary to the observation, because it does not model interdependence on the observa-
tions as a discriminative model. Secondly, the Markov assumption that a succeeding state is
only dependent on the current state is relaxed in CRF. Thirdly, a CRF defines a conditional
probability distribution that is not structured as a table, but rather induced by a small set of
parameters θ1, . . . , θK , whose possible values are more general than just exponential positive
values.
Figure 4.2: Hidden Markov Model
The goal in the training step of a CRF model is then to estimate the feature function weights
θ1, . . . , θK based on the data. In this training step, it aims at finding a sequence of weights such
that the CRF model can represent the training dataset as accurately and likely as possible.
The parameter estimation is usually performed by the penalized maximum likelihood method
[55]. Once the parameters estimates are obtained and the model is built, for any observed
feature value X∗, we can apply this model to obtain the conditional probability P (Y | X∗) for
all possible label sequence Y . Following this, we can then infer the label sequence as Y ∗ that
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has the highest probability to occur, i.e., Y ∗ = arg maxY P (Y | X∗). The Forward-Backward
and the Viterbi Algorithm [32], which are based on sending message along the chain in the only
two possible directions, can be applied for the inference. We explain the details of parameter
estimation and outcome inference later in Section 4.3 when we introduce the construction and
evaluation of our SA-CRF-IDS.
4.3 Situation Aware Intrusion Detection using Conditional Random Fields
4.3.1 Framework of SA-CRF-IDS
In this section, we describe how an SA-CRF-IDS is constructed. In particular, Figure 4.3
illustrates the framework of an SA-CRF-IDS, starting from data processing to classifier training
and evaluation. This process is elaborated in the following steps:
Step 1. Parse collected raw data into situational data following the model introduced in Sec-
tion 3.3. Specifically, we format the data to sequences of actions and environmental
contexts, and sequences of desires.
Step 2. Then we build two CRF models, by first establishing a CRF model, say desire CRF, from
sequences of actions and contexts information to desire sequences, followed by building
a CRF model, say tempICRF, from desire information to temporal intention. For train-
ing data, the temporal intention is manually labeled according to actions, contexts and
desires.
Step 3. The inference process of an SA-CRF-IDS involves two steps. In the first step, a desire
sequence is predicted based on the desire CRF model using input of a sequence of actions
and contexts. Next, use the predicted desire sequence as the input in the tempICRF
model, and obtain a sequence of temporal intention.
Step 4. The last step is to classify the observed data into being intrusion or not. This is achieved
by comparing the average value of all individual temporal intention values over time in
the predicted temporal intention sequence to a threshold γ. The selection of the threshold
γ will be covered with more details in Section 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Flowchart illusrating the training and evaluation of SA-CRF-IDS
4.3.2 Parameters Training for SA-CRF-IDS
With the situational training dataset, we apply CRF to build the intrusion detection sys-
tem. The process of building an IDS is essentially the process of parameter training. In our
IDS, the parameter training includes θ1, . . . , θK training for desire CRF and ω1, . . . , ωm training
for tempICRF as shown in Figure 4.3. In this subsection, we discuss briefly the estimation of
model parameters θ1, . . . , θK for the desire CRF model. The estimation of model parameters
ω1, . . . , ωm for the tempI CRF is similar. The parameters are usually trained by maximum like-
lihood estimation. Specifically, suppose the training dataset is D = {(Xi, Yi) | i = 1, . . . , N},
where Xi’s are feature variables and Yi’s are outcomes of interest. The maximum likelihood
principle is to find appropriate parameters such that the model can best represent the distri-
bution of training dataset D. When the training dataset contains N records, following equa-
tion (4.3), the logarithm of the joint conditional probabilities of Y1, . . . , YN given predictors
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X1, . . . , XN can be written as
L(θ,D) = log
(
N∏
i=1
P (Yi | Xi, θ)
)
=
N∑
i=1
log
[
1
Z(Xi)
exp
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
θkfk(Yi,t−1, Yi,t−1, Xi)
]
,
(4.3)
where Yi = (Yi,1, . . . , Yi,T−1) is a sequence of response at time points t = 1, . . . , T . Note that
in the above model we did not write explicitly Xi and allow it to potentially contains all it
components from different time points. Very often, for simplicity, we consider feature functions
fk such that fk(Yt, Yt−1, X) = fk(Yt, Yt−1, Xt) for each k.
The parameters can be estimated by θˆ = arg maxθ L(θ,D). In our discussion here, we con-
sider exponential families such that the maximization of the the objective function is a convex
optimization problem. More general CRF models are possible by adopting different paramet-
ric models, including varying feature functions fk and probability mass functions beyond the
exponential family.
Notice further that the above formula is generic. For instance, as we mentioned in the
previous subsection, we have two CRF models, i.e., the desire CRF model that takes action
and context sequences as X and desires sequences as Y , and the temporal intention tempICRF
model that uses desire sequences as X and temporal intention sequences as Y . In desire
model level of SA-CRF-IDS, we train the parameters θ1, . . . , θK to maximize the corresponding
objective function following (4.3). Similarly, in the temporal intention model level of SA-CRF-
IDS, we train the parameters ω1, . . . , ωm to maximize the corresponding objective function
following (4.4), where we allow potentially different feature functions gj , j = 1, . . . ,m.
L(ω,D) =
N∑
i=1
log
 1
Z(Xi)
exp
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
ωkgj(Yi,t−1, Yi,t−1, Xi)
 . (4.4)
4.3.3 Inference of SA-CRF-IDS
Once parameter estimates θˆ from the model in 4.3 and 4.4 are obtained, an SA-CRF-IDS
model is built, and we can apply the SA-CRF-IDS for inference. In particular, for any new
observed sequence Xnew, the conditional probability of observing any potential response Y
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given Xnew, i.e., P (Y | X∗, θˆ), can be easily evaluated. Then the most probable sequence Y ∗
given X and based on the predicted model is
Y ∗ = arg max
Y
P (Y |Xnew; θˆ). (4.5)
Note that the above step of finding the maximizer may not be as trivial as it looks like. The
Viterbi algorithm is frequently used for finding the most probable sequence(s) [55].
As we described in Section 4.3.1, our SA-CRF-IDS involves two CRF models. Therefore,
in the first step, we apply the desire CRF model and obtain the most probable desire sequence
desire∗ based on the sequence of actions and contexts, i.e., Xnew = {Anew, Cnew}. Then using
the temporal intention CRF model, we get the most probable temporal intention sequence
tempI∗ given desire∗.
Based on the predicted temporal intention sequence tempI∗, we can calculate the average
of tempI∗, say avg.tempI∗, over its components corresponding to temporal intention values
at different time points. We then classify the whole sequence of situations to be normal or
malicious by comparing avg.tempI∗ to a threshold γ. When avg.tempI∗ is equal or greater
than γ, we classify it as intrusion, otherwise is normal.
4.4 Experiment Design and Evaluation
To validate our hypothesis of advantages, see, e.g., Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, of using
CRFs in Intrusion Detection over HMMs, we conduct CRF-based experiments to compare the
effectiveness of a CRF and an HMM when we apply them in the same data set. In this section,
we describe details of our experiment design and the result.
4.4.1 Experiment Design
Here we conduct two experiments to compare a CRF and an HMM. In the first experiment,
we compare them in the data set, say A, that includes only the action sequences. Then in the
second experiment, we compare them in the Situational data set, say B, (see Section 3.3 for
details). In other words, we will study the following four model+dataset combinations:
(1) the HMM model on data set consisting of only action sequences, i.e., A;
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(2) the HMM model on the Situational data set, i.e., B;
(3) the CRF model on data set consisting of only action sequences, i.e., A;
(4) the CRF model on the Situational data set, i.e., B;
In Chapter 3, we have comprehensively discussed and compared (1) and (2). In this section, we
focus mainly on (3) and (4) and the comparisons between (1) and (3), as well as (2) and (4).
For each of those four experiments, we partition the dataset into a training set and a testing
set first, then generate the validation set independently. Details on how we select them and
the proportion of training, testing sets can be found in Section 3.4.1.
For implementation of CRF, we apply the open-source program CRF++ [40] to build our
SA-CRF-IDS. As can be seen in the previous section, one important component of building
a CRF model is the specification of feature functions f1, . . . , fK to be used in (4.3). In the
CRF++ tool, this is achieved by providing a feature template file. In our experiments, we adopt
the default feature template of CRF++, which is then automatically translated by CRF++
into feature functions for the CRF model. In terms of the selection of X and Y in (4.3), when
we run CRF on the first data set, A, we use action sequences as X and temporal intention
sequences as Y . When it comes to building our SA-CRF-IDS on the Situational data set, B,
we first select action and context sequences as X and desire sequences as Y to build the desire
CRF, then we use desire sequences as X and temporal intention as Y to build the tempI CRF.
In the previous section, we have discussed main procedure of the SA-CRF-IDS, e.g., the
involvement of two CRF models. Here, we illustrate in details both experiments (3) and (4)
in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, respectively. Each run of CRF++ involves two processes, i.e., a
training process and a testing process. In the training process, CRF++ takes a training data
set and outputs a training model file. This training model file is then applied by CRF++ to
the testing data set in the testing process. Take experiment (3) in Figure 4.4 for example, in
steps 1© and 2©, CRF++ toolkit first trains a tempI CRF model based on the training data set
consisting of action only sequences as X and temporal intention sequences as Y . Then using
the trained model in steps 3© and 4©, the CRF++ predicts temporal intention sequences for
the test data set.
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Figure 4.4: Process of CRF in Action-Only Sequence Data Set
For experiment (4), there are two CRF models as show in Figure 4.5. Specifically, first
of all, the CRF++ toolkit trains a desire CRF model based on (Action, Context, Desire)
components from the Situational training data set in steps 1© and 2©, and trains a tempI CRF
model based on training data consisting of desire and temporal intention sequences in steps 5©
and 6©. Then in the testing step, the desire CRF model is first applied in steps 3© and 4© to
predict a desire sequence, which is later used by the established tempI CRF model to predict
the tempI sequence in steps 7© and 8©.
The outputs from CRF++ include all information from the original testing data set, and
additionally the most probable outcome Y ∗, and the associated predicted conditional proba-
bilities p(Y ∗ | Xnew; θˆ). For instance, consider experiment (3) where we apply a CRF model
on the data set A, the following sample output in Table 4.1 gives predicted outcome for one
action sequence in the test data set. The first two columns include (Action, tempI) pairs in one
sequence from the test data set, and the third column is the predicted most probable tempI
sequence with associated probability value at each time point shown in the last column.
61
Table 4.1: Sample output from testing step by applying CRF++ on action-only sequences
Action tempI tempI∗ Prob
clickSkipPreQuestion 0 0 0.995
clickMenuHome 0 0 0.999
clickMenuSignin 0 0 0.993
clickLogin 1 1 0.882
clickLogin 4 2 0.772
clickLogin 7 4 0.755
clickLogin 10 7 0.670
clickMenuAllPapers 0 0 0.794
clickPaperInfosAllPapers 0 0 0.834
clickMenuAllPapers 1 0 0.854
clickRemoveCommentMyPapers 2 1 0.684
clickOkRemoveComment 4 2 0.648
clickMenuListUsers 0 0 0.510
clickLinkModify 1 1 0.862
clickModify 2 2 0.867
clickLinkModify 4 4 0.722
clickModify 7 7 0.665
clickMenuListUsers 0 0 0.802
clickLinkAddNewAccount 1 1 0.744
clickAddNewAccount 2 2 0.719
clickMenuAllPapers 0 0 0.649
clickRemoveCommentMyPapers 1 1 0.729
clickOkRemoveComment 2 2 0.704
clickEndSession 0 0 0.909
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Figure 4.5: Process of CRF in Situational Data Set
For experiment (4), as aforementioned, it includes two CRF models, corresponding to the
building of desire CRF and tempI CRF models. We exhibit part of the outputs corresponding
to step 4© and step 8© of Figure 4.5 in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. As can be seen in
those two tables, in the output of the desire CRF model, sequences of action and context are
taken as X, and desire as Y . Then the most probable desire sequence desire∗ is predicted with
associated probabilities at each time point displayed in the last column. In the output of the
tempI CRF model, the predicted desire sequences, i.e., Desire∗ are then used as X and tempI
sequences are used as Y , leading to predicted tempI∗ sequences. As shown in Table 4.3, the
predicted desire sequence Desire∗ in Table 4.2 is used as an input.
For inferences, as briefly covered in Section 4.3.3, we average each predicted Y ∗ sequence,
which in our case is a tempI∗ sequence, to obtain avg.tempI∗. The avg.tempI∗ values are then
compared to some threshold value γ and sequences with avg.tempI∗ larger than γ are classified
as intrusions. In the upcoming section, we discuss the results of our experiments in details.
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Table 4.2: Sample output from testing step of desire CRF by applying CRF++ on the Situa-
tional data set
Action Context
clickSkipPreQuestion NoInput NoError
clickMenuSignin NoInput NoError
clickSignup NoInput NoError
clickSignup SqlInput ErrorRemind
clickSignup SqlInput ErrorRemind
clickSignup SqlInput ErrorRemind
clickSignup SqlInput ErrorRemind
clickSignup SqlInput NoError
clickMenuSignin NoInput NoError
clickLogin SqlInput NoError
clickMenuMyPapers NoInput NoError
clickMenuUploadPaper NoInput NoError
clickMenuMyComments NoInput NoError
clickMenuAllPapers NoInput NoError
clickSubmitCommentAllPapers InsertedLink NoError
clickSubmitCommentAllPapers InsertedLink NoError
Desire Desire∗ Prob
Test Test 1.00
LogIn LogIn 0.85
SignUp SignUp 0.79
RegisterIllegalUser RegisterIllegalUser 0.97
RegisterIllegalUser RegisterIllegalUser 0.99
RegisterIllegalUser RegisterIllegalUser 1.00
RegisterIllegalUser RegisterIllegalUser 0.99
RegisterIllegalUser RegisterIllegalUser 0.95
LogIn LogIn 0.96
LogIn LogIn 0.52
UploadPaper ViewMyPapers 0.93
UploadPaper UploadPaper 0.71
EditComment ViewMyCommentInfo 0.45
EditComment ViewAllPapers 0.75
EditComment SubmitComment 0.98
EditComment SubmitComment 0.97
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Table 4.3: Sample output from testing step of tempI CRF by applying CRF++ on the Situa-
tional data set
Desire∗ tempI tempI∗ Prob
Test 0 0 0.999
LogIn 0 0 0.998
SignUp 0 0 0.966
RegisterIllegalUser 1 1 0.914
RegisterIllegalUser 2 2 0.890
RegisterIllegalUser 4 4 0.830
RegisterIllegalUser 7 7 0.770
RegisterIllegalUser 10 10 0.892
LogIn 0 0 0.971
LogIn 0 0 0.996
ViewMyPapers 0 0 0.998
UploadPaper 0 0 0.996
ViewMyCommentInfo 1 0 0.991
ViewAllPapers 2 0 0.998
SubmitComment 4 1 0.966
SubmitComment 7 2 0.920
4.4.2 Experiment Evaluation
In this subsection, we compare CRF intrusion detection methods to HMM detection meth-
ods. Similar to the definition of HMMi, i = 1, 2 in Chapter 3, we can define CRFi, i = 1, 2 as
the following:
CRF1 : CRF method making use of action sequences only;
CRF2 : CRF method making use of Situ sequences,
corresponding to experiment (3) and (4) (introduced in Section 4.4.1) respectively. Our focus
here is to compare the performance of HMMi and CRFi for each i = 1, 2. That is, we want
to compare the experiment results of (1) with (3), and (2) with (4). Again, we study their
accuracy, false positive rate, and true positive rate under different threshold values, where
ACC, FPR, TPR are defined in (3.2) - (3.4).
Firstly, we display the accuracy and ROC curve of CRF1 in Figure 4.7. For ease of reference
and comparison, we also display the accuracy and ROC curve of HMM1 in the same figure.
Those figures contain results for both the validation data set and test data set. For both HMM1
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and CRF1, we can see that validation and test data have very similar accuracy profile as their
corresponding lines almost overlap with each other, except minor difference in the ROC curve
for HMM1. In terms of threshold selection guided by accuracy, a practical threshold for CRF1
can be anywhere from 0.25 to 1 based on Figure 4.6b, leading to approximately 98% ∼ 99%
accuracy. On the other hand, based on Figure 4.6a, the threshold for HMM1 can be selected as
2.75, giving about 85% accuracy. Thus, the accuracy of CRF1 is significantly better than that
of HMM1, especially in terms of the maximum accuracy. In addition, as reflected in Figures
4.6c, 4.6d, the ROC curve of CRF1 also clearly outperforms that of HMM1.
Secondly, we compare the false positive and true positive rates of HMM1 and CRF1. We
display their FPR and TPR profiles in Figure 4.9. Again, the overall trend for the validation
and test data set behaves very similarly. If we compare Figure 4.8a and Figure 4.8b, we observe
that the FPR for CRF1 decreases very quickly towards 0 when the threshold value increases
from 0. And for a threshold value that is slightly larger than 0 but no larger than 1, the
FPR for CRF1 is controlled under 5% and the associated TPR is maintained as high as 95%.
However, the FPR for HMM1 decays much slower than CRF1 when the threshold increases.
In particular, when the threshold is increased to a level, e.g., 2.75, such that FPR for HMM1
is controlled under 5%, the corresponding TPR for HMM1 is barely over 50%. The more
dramatic difference (compared to accuracy) between TPRs of HMM1 and CRF1 when fixing
FPR is understandable. This is because, as can be seen from (3.5), the accuracy is a weighted
average of FPR and TPR, where the weights on TPR, i.e., 1−n/N (the proportion of malicious
sequences) is roughly 20% in our case (see Table 3.1). Therefore, a roughly 50% difference in
TPRs between HMM1 and CRF1 while with FPRs controlled under 5% for both of them,
translates into approximately 20% × 50% = 10% difference in accuracy, which is consistent
with the findings from Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b.
Now let us compare results from experiment (2) and (4) corresponding to HMM2 and CRF2.
Similarly, we can look at accuracy, ROC curve, false positive rate, and true positive rate. We
display their accuracy and ROC curves in Figure 4.11. First of all, the lines for validation
data set and test data set align better for CRF2, as visible difference can be seen between the
curves of validation and test datasets for HMM1. In terms of maximum accuracy values, CRF2
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Figure 4.7: Accuracy and ROC curves of HMM1 and CRF1
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Figure 4.9: False Positive Rates and True Positive Rates of HMM1 and CRF1
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has slightly larger maximum accuracy values (about 98% range)than that of HMM2 (about
95% range). In addition, their overall trends with respect to the threshold value are similar,
with CRF2 climbing to the top sooner than HMM2 when threshold increases from 0. On the
other hand, the ROC curves in Figures 4.10c, 4.10d show that CRF2 has better ROC curve
performance than that of HMM1.
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Figure 4.11: Accuracy and ROC curves of HMM2 and CRF2
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Lastly, if we examine the false positive rates and true positive rates displayed in Figure 4.13.
For HMM2, the TPR is in 85% ∼ 95% range when the FPR is controlled under 5%. However,
the TPR for CRF2 is about 98% when its FPR is controlled under 5%.
In summary, from the above discussion, we can see all of HMM2, CRF1 and CRF2 perform
better than HMM1 in our case study. That is, CRF models are more efficient than the HMM
model using only action sequences. On the other hand, CRF2 has slightly better performance
than and HMM2, and similar performance as CRF1.
4.5 Conclusions
CRF models are more flexible than HMM models, and can be more adaptive in real appli-
cations. In our experiments, we found that CRFs can lead to more efficient intrusion detection
systems than HMMs. On the other hand, an alternative approach to improve efficiency of an
intrusion detection system is to build the system on more informative data. In our discussion
here, we introduce the Situational data model, which provides more information than action
only sequences. Therefore, our experiments also demonstrate that an IDS making use of more
informative data can be more efficient, as can be seen in the advantage of HMM2 over HMM1.
In fact, we see that by adopting either a CRF model or a Situational data model, it gives more
efficient IDS than using HMM on action-only sequences. In addition, when HMM and CRF are
applied on the Situational data set, CRF2 performs slightly better and is also more robust than
HMM2, while both models have relatively satisfactory performance. For CRF1 and CRF2, their
performance are very similar. However, we should acknowledge that any experiment on a single
data set may be limited by the nature of the data itself. In our study, it may be that when
both methods, i.e., CRF1 and CRF2, have very high accuracy, it is not possible to distinguish
them over the current data. To explore in this direction further, a comparison between them
on a different and larger situational data may be warranted.
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(a) FPR and TPR of HMM2
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Figure 4.13: False Positive Rates and True Positive Rates of HMM2 and CRF2
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION
This thesis contributes to improving the effectiveness of Intrusion Detection Systems built
by probabilistic graphical models from following three different perspectives:
1. Firstly, we propose to apply the Bayesian Model Averaging of Bayesian Network Classi-
fiers (BNMA) to build Intrusion Detection Systems. We compare the BNMA with Naive
Bayes and Bayesian Network by using them to train IDS in the KDD data set. The
result of our experiment shows that the BNMA is more efficient and more reliable than
the other two models based on static data without time stamps, especially when only a
small size of training data set is available.
2. Secondly, we build Situational Data Model as a mechanism for collecting dynamic se-
quential data set to train Intrusion Detection Systems. This Situational Data Model
motivated by finding and utilizing the relationship between intrusion occurrences and the
features’ change over time. It is more informative by revealing footprints that a user
left on the target system. We structure the Situational Data Model in time order and
also add the human internal mental states, i.e., desires, to it. We define the quantitative
measure (temporal intention) at each time point that describes the likelihood of being
an intrusion at this specific time. Based on the Situational Data Model we designed, a
Situational Data Set was collected on a real web application system named “CoRE” for
training and evaluating Intrusion Detection Systems. We then applied Hidden Markov
Models on both of the Situational sequences data set and action-only sequences data set
to compare these two different data models. From our experiment results, we observe
that our Situational Data Set is more effective than the action-only sequences data set.
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3. Thirdly, based on the foundation of the dynamic sequential data (Situational Data Set
and Action Only sequence data set) collected from the CoRE system, we propose to
apply Conditional Random Fields for building Intrusion Detection Systems. Theoreti-
cally, CRFs are able to utilize information from the sequential data more flexibly and
thoroughly. In addition, it is more representative and appropriate for intrusion detection
than other dynamical training models such as HMMs. To test our hypothesis, we con-
ducted experiments of applying CRF and HMM in action-only sequences data set and
also in the Situational Data Set. From the experiment results, we see that the CRF
outperforms the HMM significantly when we apply them in the actions only sequences.
On the other hand, when it comes to the Situational Data Set, their performance are
competitive with the CRF edging HMM slightly.
In summary, Bayesian Model Averaging of Bayesian Network Classifiers can benefit training
Intrusion Detection Systems, especially for static data set of relatively small size. To detect
intrusions before they eventually cause damage to the system, which typically leads to obvious
abnormal changes for the static environmental context, we should build dynamical intrusion
detection systems. Our Situational Data Model combined with Conditional Random Fields
could be very valuable for building more effective dynamic intrusion detection systems, as
evidenced from our experiment results. There are, however, still several limitations in this
thesis:
1. The malicious data sets we collect from CoRE application are generated from assumed
intruders but not real professional intruders. Our research could be more precise if we
are able to get real malicious data from some real-life web applications to train our
Intrusion Detection System. This limitation might also help explain that the effectiveness
of HMM is comparable with CRF when both are applied in our Situational Data Set.
Another possible reason for this phenomenon could be that the Situational Data Set has
helped improve the effectiveness to a substantial degree that there is not much room left
for further improvement in our Situational Data Set. Professional attackers could hide
their malicious desires better in the observed situational sequences. In that case, the
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advantages of CRF may be more obvious and we may be able to see that it outperforms
HMM obviously. However, it is not easy to collect those sensitive data for research use
due to credential concerns. Based on this limitation, we have tried our best to make our
experiments as close as to real practice. We collected our data from a real web application
CoRE, which provides a lot of functionalities that are frequently used in many other real
web applications. Also, all the assumed intruders participate in our experiments are from
Computer Science or related background and they are also trained with attacking skills
before the experiments. Thus our assumed intruders can apply different attacking skills
in their own way to attack the system and they closely mimic many kinds of attacking
behaviors used by real attackers. Therefore, we believe that our research result is very
convincing.
2. We have used supervised learning to train the Intrusion Detection Model. If we apply
this method in real practice, we need to manually label both the desires and temporal
intentions for our training data set. On the other hand, we don’t need to label those
for training data set when it comes to unsupervised learning, which usually performs
clustering analysis on the training data set first, and then do the classification. However,
unsupervised learning for intrusion detection usually has a very strong assumption that
the amount of normal data is always much more than that of malicious data in the
training data set. This assumption may not always be true in practice, thus it limits the
application scope of the IDS in the real world. With our supervised learning methodology
proposed in this thesis, we need the manual work for preparing and formatting the historic
training data set. Nevertheless, we believe that our research is valuable since both the
model training and classification process are automatic and can run in real time.
Our future work can focus on two aspects. The first aspect is to optimize the Situational
Data Model. Currently, we collect the actions and environmental context information. All
those collected information is only related to functional features. In the future, we may con-
sider collecting some non-functional features in our sequences of situations to train Intrusion
Detection System, such as throughput of the network, response time, etc. Also, we can work on
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collecting another data set based on optimized Situational Data Model, and test the reliability
of our methodology in data sets collected in other applications or platforms. The other aspect
is to conduct some research on how to use unsupervised learning on this issue without the
assumption that the amount of malicious data is always less than the normal data.
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